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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to identify and outline the sustainable funding 
models for BEE transactions in the South African mining industry. It is 
proposed that from the early 2000s to 2014 the sustainability of BEE funding 
models was driven by regulatory pressure. In the absence of regulatory 
pressure, there would be a need to develop alternative funding models.  
The study uses a quantitative research methodology by examining the 
frequency of use of various funding models, the impact of regulatory 
interventions and use of various funding sources on the sustainability of 
funding models, regression analysis and significance testing.  
The research results show that the percentage of third party finance in 
funding structures has a negative correlation with the success of BEE 
transactions. Vendor finance shows a positive correlation with the 
sustainability of transactions, more so above 60% in the funding structures. 
Equity finance has a positive impact on the success of transactions from as 
low as 20% in the funding structures. 
An ideal funding structure would consist of the following funding sources: 
 Third party: Vendor: Equity = 40%: 20%: 40%, in the case of a BEE 
company that has equity available and  
 Third party: Vendor = <40%: > 60%, where no equity is available to 
BEE entrepreneurs. 
In the absence of BEE laws third party finance will dominate funding of 
empowerment transactions. Funding models based on third party finance 
must rely more on cash flow based payments rather than dividend payments 
to service debt. 
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DEFINITIONS  
A Class Shares: Shares that carry 100% voting rights with no immediate 
economic benefit to the shareholder. They were typically held by BEE 
investors in a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV).  
B Class Shares: Low voting shares with 100% of economic ‘participation’. 
Typically no      immediate economic benefit will flow to the BEE Company 
until the B class shares have been redeemed. They are typically held by 
corporate investors or financiers in SPVs. 
Structured Finance: The use of different forms of debt, equity and derivative 
instruments to tailor make funding to suit both the empowerment partner and 
parent company’s needs. In this report Structured Financed Transactions are 
transactions that were financed through a mixture of two or more of the 
following funding mechanisms: vendor finance, third party finance, equity 
finance and preference share instruments.   
Success Rate of a Funding Mechanism: Success rate is the ratio of the 
number of sustainable transactions consisting of a given funding mechanism 
to the total number of transactions consisting of that funding mechanism 
above a given percentage of the said funding mechanism within the funding 
structure. For example, the success rate of Equity Finance (EF) above 10% in 
the funding structure is calculated as follows:  
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝐹 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 10% 
=  
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐸𝐹 > 10%
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐸𝐹 > 10% 
 
Sustainable Transaction: A Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
transaction which has resulted in a BEE company effectively owning the 
same number of shares that it initially acquired from a parent mining 
company, or if the shareholding has reduced, the balance of shares were sold 
xii 
 
by a BEE company profitably. Where effective shareholding could not be 
established, sustainability was recognized based on total BEE shareholding 
reported by either the parent or BEE mining company at the time of the 
research. Transactions in which the parent mining company intervened to 
prevent the collapse of the BEE deal were classified as unsustainable.    
Tier I or Major Mining Company: A major producer that generates its cash 
flow from the production and sale of the commodity it is mining. 
Mid-Tier Mining Company: It is typically an exploration company that has 
decided to be a producer, primarily on the mineral deposits it has discovered. 
The company could hold a number of mining operations and projects.     
Junior Mining Company: Junior mining companies focus exclusively on 
exploration and discovery of new economic deposits. They derive their 
income from issue of new shares. They could be considered as venture 
capital companies as they rely mostly on capital markets to fund exploration 
activities.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1. BACKGROUND  
1.1.1. Exclusion of Historically Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs) 
from Ownership of Minerals 
Before 1913, ownership of mineral rights lied predominantly with the state. 
The first move towards state ownership of minerals happened in 1813. Then, 
the Cradock Proclamation of 1813 reserved the right to mine precious stones, 
gold and silver for the government of the Cape Colony (Cawood & Minnitt, 
1998). As various provinces were established across the country through the 
1836 Great Trek, respective governments clung to the principle of ‘state 
ownership of mineral rights’. This principle was consolidated in the Union of 
South Africa through the Land Settlement Act of 1912, which reserved 
ownership of all minerals for the state (Cawood & Minnitt, 1998).  
Under the common law, which emanated from the Roman Dutch legal 
system, a landowner owned everything above and below the land, including 
minerals. The Native Land Act 27 of 1913 facilitated the transfer of land 
ownership from black South Africans to white South Africans during the 
apartheid era. The consequence of the promulgation of the aforementioned 
Act was the transfer of 87% of land ownership to white South Africans 
(Mogoeng, 2013); therefore, landlessness lead to automatic exclusion of 
HDSAs from ownership of mineral rights in the country (Mogoeng, 2013). As 
a result, they had no access to entrepreneurial activities within the mining 
sector.  
In 1917 the ownership of minerals, except the right to mine gold, silver and 
precious stones, was privatized (Cawood & Minnitt, 1998). Since then 
numerous pieces of legislation, governing the rights to own and mine 
minerals, were promulgated and repealed. Notably, the Minerals Act 50 of 
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1991, which was promulgated in 1992, provided for exclusive ownership of 
minerals by private persons. A common weakness in all the mineral laws that 
were passed and abolished between 1913 and 1992 was their failure to 
address the fundamental exclusion of HDSAs from ownership of land and 
minerals.  
1.1.2. Changes in the Minerals and Mining Policy  
In the early 1990s, as South Africa was moving towards transformation in the 
political regime, changes in the mineral laws aimed primarily at redressing the 
injustices of the past began to surface. Significant strides happened post 
1994, after the African National Congress (ANC) was voted into government. 
These changes were informed by the Freedom Charter of 1955. Noteworthy 
in the Freedom Charter is item number 3, which states that “the people shall 
share in the country's wealth”. Specific to the mining industry is the 
declaration that “the mineral wealth beneath the soil shall be transferred to 
the ownership of the people as a whole” (Congress of the People, 1955).  
The enforcement of the declarations contained in the Freedom Charter was 
part of the discussions in the ANC’s readiness to govern conference, which 
was held in 1992. In 1995, the ANC government initiated the formulation of a 
policy document that would allow it to transfer ownership of minerals to the 
people of South Africa.  Stakeholders (National Union of Mine workers, 
Chamber of Mines and Government of National Unity) submitted proposals. 
These were captured in a discussion document that was compiled in 
November 1995 (Rocha, 2013).  
A draft green paper on minerals and mining policy was delivered to 
government in 1998. In the same year public comments were incorporated 
into the green paper and it was submitted to cabinet. The white paper on 
minerals and mining policy for South Africa was approved by cabinet in 
October 1998 (Rocha, 2013). This made way for the drafting of the Minerals 
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and Petroleum Resources Development Act, which happened between 1999 
and 2002. Cabinet approved the bill for introduction into parliament in early 
2002. The bill was approved by parliament in June 2002 and the Minerals and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act, Act No. 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) came 
into operation on the 1st of May 2004 (Rocha, 2013).  
Section 3.(1) of the MPRDA states that “mineral and petroleum resources are 
the common heritage of all the people of South Africa”. Under the MPRDA, 
the state is the custodian of the minerals. This policy of state custodianship 
over minerals empowers the minister of mineral resources to enforce the 
principle of equitable access to minerals, thus giving all South Africans equal 
opportunity to meaningfully participate in economic activities within the mining 
sector. Additionally, the MPRDA specifically focuses on redressing the 
negative effects of the apartheid laws (MPRDA Section 100). The Mining 
Charter is the regulatory tool used for this purpose.  
1.1.3. The Mining Charter and Empowerment Performance 
In 2004, the Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the 
South African Mining and Minerals Industry (Mining Charter) was promulgated 
in terms of section 100 of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA), Act No. 28 of 2002 (Republic of South Africa, 
2002). The Mining Charter set targets for 9 elements of transformation in the 
South African mining industry. These include the element of ownership, which 
seeks to effect transformation in the area of ownership of mining businesses 
within South Africa. Two targets, which are 15% and 26% transfer of 
ownership to Historically Disadvantages South Africans (HDSAs) by 2009 and 
2014 respectively, were set.  
As a result of the requirements of the ownership element of the Mining 
Charter, the number of black economic empowerment transactions in the 
South African mining sector increased (Figure 1.1). However, some 
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empowerment deals failed at a later stage, mainly as a result of 
unsustainable funding models (Vernon, 2010). 
 
Figure 1.1: Increase in the number of empowerment transactions after the 
promulgation of the Mining Charter (Source: Empowerdex, 2009, p4). 
In 2009, the DMR conducted a review to assess the level of compliance of 
mining companies with the elements of the Mining Charter. The report of the 
assessment indicated that there was slow progress in the implementation of 
the element of ownership. According to the DMR, mining companies had, on 
average, achieved 8.9% transfer of ownership to HDSAs against a target of 
15% (DMR, 2009). However, the mining businesses – represented by the 
Chamber of Mines (COM) – argued that the mining industry had achieved 
over 15% transfer of ownership to HDSAs. The COM indicated that majority 
of its members had already achieved the 26% transfer of ownership required 
by the element of ownership of the Mining Charter (PMG, 2013).   
In 2014, the DMR began a second assessment of mining companies’ 
compliance with the Mining Charter. According to Anthony (2013, cited in 
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Mail&Guardian, 2013), most industry experts expected the mining companies 
to meet the 26% ownership target. Although some shares contributing 
towards the 26% could still be encumbered (Hawes, 2013 cited in 
Mail&Guardian, 2013), the success of the transactions associated with 
encumbered shares would result in a better performance by the mining 
industry. 
33 of the 35 mining companies considered in this research already comply 
with the 26% ownership target (Figure 1.2). Thus confirming experts’ 
expectations mentioned above.  
 
Figure 1.2: % HDSA ownership in South African mining companies 
Source: individual mining companies’ websites and annual reports (as of 
March 2014) 
It is unclear what direction the government will take in terms of BEE 
legislation post the 2014 Mining Charter compliance assessment. 
Nevertheless, as more mining companies achieve the ownership targets set 
by the current Mining Charter and any amendments that may be made post 
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the above mentioned assessment, one can expect empowerment 
transactions to be driven less by legislative pressure and more by business 
fundamentals; although legal pressure may be prolonged by government’s 
reluctance to uphold the principle of ‘once empowered, always empowered’.  
Legal factors that impact the current funding structures or models used in 
BEE transactions may become irrelevant. Hence a question of whether the 
empowerment funding models that were used since the inception of BEE to 
2014 will remain sustainable in a different regulatory environment.  
Circumstances will be different and the playfield of obtaining funding may be 
‘level’, therefore HDSA companies may not have the ‘competitive advantage’ 
provided by regulatory pressure. 
It is thus necessary to study the historical performance of various funding 
methods and understand how sustainable they would be going forward. This 
will assist entrepreneurs and other relevant stakeholders involved in the 
setting up of BEE transactions to structure deals in ways that would enhance 
sustainability.   
1.2. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY  
The purpose of this study is to identify and outline the sustainable funding 
model(s) for Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) transactions in the South 
African mining sector.  
The aim of the project is to compile a report that could assist stakeholders in 
mining empowerment deals to conclude transactions that would result in 
sustainable mining businesses, and hence contribute to the growth of the 
South African mining sector and the economy at large.  
It is proposed that from the 2000s to 2014 empowerment deals were driven, 
largely by regulatory pressure. Mining companies were compelled by the 
Mining Charter to transfer 26% of ownership to HDSAs; failing which punitive 
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measures, such as non-renewal of mining license and withdrawal of 
prospecting or mining licenses (DMR, 2010a), could occur.  
It could be expected that once mining companies comply with the 26% HDSA 
ownership requirement, regulatory pressure will diminish. If the regulatory 
pressure doesn’t change immediately after the 2014 assessment, it will 
happen at some point in the future as BEE is not infinite. Therefore, it is 
necessary to research how BEE funding models can be kept sustainable in a 
different regulatory environment.   
Growing shareholder demand for increased value add and greater capital 
contribution by  BEE partners may add a layer of complexity to the question 
of how BEE deals can be made more sustainable. Also, the trend of 
shareholders requiring greater value add and capital contribution suggests 
that in the absence of regulatory pressure ‘empowerment funding’ could take 
a different direction, hence the need for this research.  
Review of literature indicates that some research work was carried out in the 
area of financing of BEE deals in South Africa. However, researches 
conducted focused on the factors that influence the structure of the deals, 
efficiency of the funding models, the use of innovative funding models and 
mechanisms of various funding structure etc., but no research looked at the 
sustainability of empowerment deals in an environment where legal factors 
have minimal influence on financial models used. This project seeks to 
advance research in the area of BEE funding in the mining industry a step 
further by investigating the sustainability of funding models used in 
empowerment transactions when there is no regulatory pressure.  
Most of the research conducted in the past relied solely on data collected 
through interviews with various industry experts (qualitative approach). While 
such approach has resulted in the publication of documents that have 
advanced the current knowledge and enhanced the experts’ understanding of 
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empowerment funding models, it has the potential of introducing bias and 
subjectivity to the data collected, and thereby results in erroneous 
conclusions being made. Research based on quantitative analysis of 
statistical data of the performance of various funding models is limited, as 
there was no data to conduct such studies when early research was done.  
This research will further contribute towards understanding of various funding 
models by analysing how companies that were empowered using various 
models have performed over time. The use of actual performance data will 
provide the opportunity to test conclusions that were drawn by researchers 
who relied exclusively on qualitative research methodology. 
1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
This research will address the following questions: 
 How sustainable are current BEE funding models? Will the current 
models remain sustainable in a relaxed regulatory environment or in 
the absence of legislation compelling parent companies to empower 
BEE partners?  
 How can various stakeholders ensure that funding models used in BEE 
transactions are sustainable post the BEE legislation era? 
 What are the funding models that will work in the absence of regulatory 
pressure? 
1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
The aim of the research is to investigate funding structures or models that 
would be suitable in the presence or absence of regulatory pressure to 
support BEE imperatives and to provide quantitative studies that can be used 
to test hypothesis often quoted in popular press. Emphasis will be put on 
models that will be sustainable if there is no black economic empowerment 
law. The following objectives will be fulfilled: 
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 Frequency analysis to identify funding methods that were preferred 
from the inception of BEE to 2014 
 Quantifying the impact of change in the regulatory environment on the 
use and successes of various funding methods 
 Quantifying the impact of various funding methods on the success of 
BEE funding structures 
 Investigating the existence of correlation between funding methods 
and the sustainability of transactions 
 Test the statistical significance of established relationships 
 Elaborate on the implications of established results on the future of 
BEE funding in the mining sector. 
1.5. SUPPORTED OBSERVATIONS 
Some Black Economic Empowerment transactions were concluded before the 
promulgation of the mining charter. The Black Economic Empowerment 
commission recommended the drafting of the Black Economic Empowerment 
Act in September 2000 (Rocha, 2013). The BEE Act became effective in 
2003 and, specific to the mining industry, the mining charter was 
subsequently promulgated in 2004. Therefore, in the early 1990s to 2004, the 
mining industry took a proactive and innovative approach towards Black 
Economic Empowerment.  
During that period empowerment transactions were not characterised by 
regulatory pressure; although the mining sector was anticipating regulatory 
change and a shift in government policy towards de-racialization of the 
economy. Also, it was in the best interest of business to ensure that the 
business environment was kept stable during the political transition period. 
Central to meeting this objective was making businesses, including in the 
mining industry, accommodative towards South Africans who were previously 
disadvantaged. 
10 
 
Hence the following observations, which form part of factors that influence the 
flexibility of empowerment funding models, will be tested: 
SUPPORTED OBSERVATIONS  
1 
Due to the attainment of stipulated Mining Charter targets and higher 
degree of certainty in the policy direction, the mining companies will be 
less likely to initiate empowerment transactions post the BEE legislation 
era 
2 
As a result, funding of empowerment transactions will become more 
difficult when there is no regulatory pressure forcing mining companies to 
provide vendor finance 
3 
While the volume of empowerment transactions will decrease, concluded 
transactions will be more sustainable as they will be based on business 
fundamentals rather than regulatory pressure 
4 
Government funding institutions will have to play an increasingly bigger 
role to make funding of empowerment transactions more sustainable 
Tab le  1 .1 :  Suppo r ted  observa t ions   
1.6. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
Numerous researchers have highlighted that there’s no ‘one size fits all’ 
approach to funding of empowerment transactions. The models identified and 
investigated will not provide a guarantee of success upon their use without a 
prior thorough assessment of their suitability to specific transactions.  
Detailed information on funding of BEE transactions is not easily obtainable in 
the public domain, especially for companies that are not listed. This resulted 
in the use of a relatively small sample size, which in turn influenced research 
results.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1. INTRODUCTION  
2.1.1. MECHANISMS OF FINANCING ACQUISITIONS: 
OVERVIEW  
The funding of BEE transactions falls mainly within the field of Acquisition 
Finance. So this section of the report focuses on providing a broad overview 
of the mechanisms of financing acquisitions. The adaptation of the concepts 
of acquisition finance to mining BEE transactions is subsequently discussed 
in section 2.2 – 2.5.  
Acquisition of enterprises (full or partial) can be financed in three ways: 
through cash payment, share exchange or a combination of the two (Firer et 
al, 2012). The funding method used in a transaction depends on the cash 
flow strength of the acquiring and target firm, their levels of gearing, ability to 
access alternative forms of funding, the economic climate, strategies being 
pursued by both companies and the perceived impact of the selected funding 
method(s) on the post-acquisition value of the acquiring firm.   
2.1.1.1. MECHANISMS BASED ON CASH PAYMENT  
In the case of cash payment, the purchasing enterprise can use internal cash 
resources, or it can obtain cash by borrowing money from either private or 
public lenders. Alternatively, cash could be raised by issuing shares to new or 
existing shareholders. Other mechanisms of raising cash are mainly hybrids 
of debt and equity (Welch, 2009).  
a. Finance Based on Internal Cash Resources  
An acquiring company must have surplus cash resources in order to use 
internal funding. Typically, the surplus cash would have been accumulated 
through retained earnings (Borghgraef, 2014).  
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The challenge with this funding method is that companies do not always have 
excess cash. If it is available, it may not be sufficient to cover all funding 
requirements on large transactions. Therefore, internal funding is often used 
in hybrid funding structures with other supplementary funding methods.   
The advantages of using internal funding are: 
 Limited information disclosure which minimizes the possibility of 
reevaluation of the acquiring company’s value post-acquisition  
 Low risk of defaulting on debt  
b. Borrowing  
Borrowing should ideally be used if the target company has many assets, a 
positive cash flow and a strong profit margin (Brown, 2011). These may be 
required by the lender as security. Low levels of gearing in both the target 
and acquiring company are preferable as they signal capacity to acquire 
additional debt and are associated with good credit ratings. If the purchaser 
has a good credit scores, the process of negotiating favorable loan terms 
becomes relatively easy. So it is crucial for the purchasing company to 
demonstrate strong cash flow, manageable debt to equity ratio and strategic 
capital deployment (Ernst & Young, 2012).  
It is sometimes tempting for companies that carry large acquisitions to use 
high levels of debt due to tax benefits. However, this may cause the 
acquisition to fail if the economy declines. CBIZ (2008) advices acquiring 
companies to consider the following factors in order to guard against an 
eventuality of a default:  
 Interest coverage ratio: This is the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) to interest charges. It indicates the number of times 
interests are covered by earnings. Lenders look at this ratio to 
ascertain whether the borrower can afford additional debt. Sometimes 
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the loan agreement stipulates a minimum ratio that a firm should keep 
(CBIZ, 2008).  
 Debt coverage ratio: It is the ratio of free cash flow (net operating 
profit) to interest plus principal amount. It reflects the company’s ability 
to repay the principal amount. A ratio of 2:1 is preferable. The loan 
contract may specify a particular level of liquidity that the borrower 
must keep, failing which a default could be declared and the firm may 
be forced into bankruptcy (Welch, 2009).  
Financing acquisition through borrowing has the following challenges: 
 Returns from the target company must exceed the interest charges. 
 The gearing ratio of the purchasing enterprise will increase and it will 
be perceived as a riskier investment. 
 Shareholders may require a higher PE ratio as a result of a higher risk. 
The advantage is that: 
 Interest payments may be tax deductible. 
c. Mezzanine Finance  
Mezzanine finance is a hybrid of debt and equity. The debt component of the 
finance is normally provided by banks. It could be either senior and (or) 
subordinated debt (Brown, 2011). The equity component is usually in the form 
of preferred shares. The advantage of using preferred shares is that the 
buyer doesn’t lose control of the enterprise. Mezzanine finance is explained in 
details in section 2.3.2.3. 
d. Asset-based Finance  
According to Brown (2011), “asset-based loans are revolving loans secured 
by the available collateral, such as inventory, accounts receivable, equipment 
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and fixed assets.” Asset-based lenders prioritize collateral over gearing and 
quality of earnings. A loan amount of between 65 percent and 80 percent of 
the assets can be obtained. The maximum loan amount established by the 
institution can only be exceeded through renegotiation of the loan agreement 
(CBIZ, 2008). 
The disadvantage of asset-based landing is high interest charges. Lenders 
can charge between 12 percent and 28 percent interests.   
e. Share Issue  
Several factors must be considered before selling shares to raise capital. If 
shares are issued to new shareholders, managers of the acquiring company 
must consider the trading value of the company’s share. If the purchasing 
company’s shares are believed to be trading at a price that is significantly 
below its value, new shares should not be issued as this would result in a 
loss. It’s ideal to issue stock to raise money if the share price is overvalued 
(New York University, n.d).  
Dilution of existing shareholders’ shares, market and book values of shares 
must also be considered as it can destroy value (Firer et al, 2012).  
If shares are issued to existing shareholders (through Rights Issue), their 
earnings could be diluted if the price earnings ratio (PE Ratio) of the target 
company is lower than that of the purchasing enterprise. This challenge could 
be exacerbated by high transaction costs, which may dilute return on capital 
even if the PE ratios of the two enterprises are the same (Palmer, 2012).  
Shares could be sold to private equity firms, venture capitalists and angel 
investors, depending on the amount of capital the buyer wishes to raise.  
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f. Vendor Finance 
The use of vendor or seller finance increases when there is scarce liquidity in 
the financial markets or when the economy is sluggish. During a difficult 
economic environment, lenders modify their lending criteria, thus restricting 
the available credit and flow of capital to entrepreneurs (Brown, 2011). Sellers 
sometimes bridge the resultant funding gap, especially if the success of the 
transaction adds significant value to the seller.  
Sellers may also have to finance the sale when the target business does not 
look attractive to traditional lenders (Cooper, 1998). 
In a typical transaction, an acquiring company makes a down payment 
agreed upon and the seller provides a promissory note, effectively backing 
the loan using the assets being sold as primary collateral (CBIZ, 1998). The 
seller note could last from 5 to 7 years (Cooper, 1998). Sellers can finance up 
to 70% of the sale price. Interest rates of 8% to 10% are common in vendor 
financed transactions.  
Advantages of vendor finance to the acquiring business are: 
 It indicates to the buyer that the seller has confidence in the future of 
the business. 
 Sellers are likely to maintain business goodwill if they have a stake in 
the business over the transition period.  
The Vendor benefits from the following: 
 Better price for the business and speedier sale. Seller financed sales 
can result in a selling price that is 15% higher than the price in cash 
based sales (Handelsman, 2012). 
 Tax savings and increased profitability. Capital gains tax can be 
stretched over a number of years if the transaction is seller financed. 
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If the acquirer cannot make payments the seller can declare the loan in 
default and the acquired business could revert back to the seller.  
2.1.1.2. SHARE EXCHANGE  
Share exchange is normally used when the purchasing enterprise doesn’t 
have sufficient free cash flow to use internal funding and it wants to avoid 
debt financing and the associated interest charges and gearing implications. 
Shares in the target company are obtained by issuing shares of the 
purchasing enterprise to the target company’s shareholders. This process 
normally works when both parties believe that the shares of the other 
enterprise are more valuable than those of their own company (Palmer, 
2012).  
The two firms must agree on the ratio of exchange, which is usually 
determined by two factors (Firer et al, 2012): 
1. The market values of the two companies and the anticipated benefits 
of the acquisition. Shareholders of the target company get a better 
ratio if there are more perceived benefits. 
2. Earnings per share (EPS). Dilution of earnings could occur in either 
entity. If the EPS of the purchasing company is lower than that of the 
target company, the target company’s earnings will be diluted after the 
acquisition. It’s preferable for the target company to have higher EPS 
as the purchasing company will benefit from improved earnings post 
the acquisition.  
The advantage of share exchange to the acquiring firm comes from locking in 
shareholders of the target company, provided they are not allowed to sell 
their new shares for a given period. They may assist in generating wealth for 
the purchasing enterprise (Palmer, 2012).  
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The advantage to the target company may emanate from tax savings as 
capital gains tax may be deferred on the exchanged shares (New York 
University, n.d). If there is mispricing on either company’s shares, the ratio of 
shares exchanged could be skewed, thus causing the firm whose share are 
correctly priced to lose value.  
2.1.1.3. HYBRID STUCTURES  
a. Deferred Purchase   
This mechanism is often used to reduce the risk associated with the purchase 
of the new enterprise. By deferring the purchase or defining some earnout 
structure based on the performance of the target company, the vendors get 
locked in for a given period (Palmer, 2012).  Thus, the risks that may have 
been overlooked during the due diligence stage can still be ironed out during 
the ‘lock in’ period. The buyer also benefits from lower employee turnover as 
a result of retaining skills from the target company for a given period. 
Additionally, this payment arrangement could potentially lower the purchase 
price if the buyer agrees to an earnout structures that promises future 
benefits to the seller (CBIZ, 2008).  
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2.1.2. FUNDING OF BEE TRANSACTIONS: OVERVIEW  
Since the inception of democracy in the early 1990s various researchers 
studied BEE funding. Issues such as the impact of lack of access to capital, 
lack of entrepreneurial track record, business experience, collateral and 
inadequate pool of financial capital in the public and private sectors to fund 
empowerment transactions have been looked at (Phillips, 2004). 
To date, the sustainability of BEE transactions has been highlighted as one of 
the major challenges faced by both BEE and parent mining companies. The 
efficiency of funding models that were used in the early days of BEE 
transactions (1992-2003) – such as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and 
equity participation – was questioned; and various authors indicated that the 
models were not effective (Nhlapo, 2008; Phillips, 2004; Ramathe, 2009; 
Ngwenya, 2007).  
In the early days of BEE (1992-2003), third party funding was popular due to 
the practical and legal challenges that were experienced with the use of 
vendor and self-funding methods. Self-funding could not be used as HDSAs 
lacked the capital to acquire assets. Vendor financing could not be used due 
to the legal restrictions that emanated from section 38 of the companies act 
(Table 2.1). From 2004 to 2013, more flexible funding models e.g. derivatives 
or options, Leverage Buy Outs (LBOs) and Vendor finance were introduced in 
order to make BEE transactions more sustainable (Nhlapo, 2008). However, 
insufficient ‘black capital’ resulting in 100% borrowing by HDSAs in some 
cases still caused some transactions to fail due to high levels of gearing. 
Furthermore, the complexity of innovative funding structures increased the 
risk of noncompliance with the tax and company legislation (Ramathe, 2009). 
Up till now, funding of empowerment deals through banks remain expensive 
as banks still perceive BEE transactions as highly risky, hence higher interest 
charges on loans given to BEE investors. 
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Ramaphosa at el (2007) noted that most BEE transactions were financed 
using structured finance due to lack of capital on the side of BEE investors. At 
the time of conducting this research the situation was still the same as HDSA 
entrepreneurs still lacked sufficient capital to acquire assets without the 
assistance of vendors and third party funders. Structured finance is the use of 
different forms of debt, equity and derivative instruments to tailor make 
funding to suit both the empowerment partner and parent company’s needs.  
This section of the project looks at funding models that were used since the 
start of BEE in the South African mining industry to 2014. Models that were 
used prior to the promulgation of BEE legislation in the mining industry are 
examined; thereafter models that were used during the period of BEE 
legislation are looked at. The sustainability of various funding models through 
different market conditions and legal regimes is reviewed. Significant, 
regulatory and economic events that will be referred to in this section of the 
report are shown in table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1: Time-line diagram showing dates of noteworthy events in the 
mining BEE environment 
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2.2. FUNDING OF EMPOWERMENT TRANSACTIONS PRIOR 
TO THE PROMULGATION OF BEE LEGISLATION 
2.2.1. Special Purpose Vehicles 
A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is a hybrid structure that uses both cash 
based and share exchange payment methods. It is a special company 
created for the sole purpose of acquiring shares in a parent company 
(Nhlapo, 2008). This funding model entails the acquisition of ordinary shares 
from a parent company by a SPV, which in turn obtains funding form a 
financial institution (Bowman Gilfillan, 2001). In SPVs, the BEE Partner gets 
voting rights in a parent company whereas the financier owns the shares 
(Phillips, 2004). The BEE Partner issues preference shares of the SPV to the 
financier, while the BEE Partner holds 100% of ordinary shares in the SPV 
(Bowman Gilfillan, 2001). 
The preference shares owned by the financier can be bought back in three to 
five years. Before the preference shares are redeemed, the financier is 
entitled to dividends from the SPV. The dividends are normally expressed as 
a percentage of a prime lending rate, and it normally varies between 60-65% 
of the prime lending rate (Van der Nest, 2004). Dividends received by the 
SPV from the parent company must be sufficient to cover the preference 
shares dividends to the financier as well as to buy back the preference shares 
at the end of the term specified by the financier (Nhlapo, 2008).   
Phillips (2004) indicated that dividends paid from a parent company to the 
SPV must be sufficient to cover the debt preference hurdle rate set by the 
financier; failing which the balance to the hurdle rate is added to the loan thus 
increasing the debt burden of the HDSA entrepreneurs. This could result in 
dilution or total loss of HDSA ownership in a parent company. Figure 2.1 
below indicates the general structure of SPVs that were used in BEE 
transactions. 
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Figure 2.1: Generic Structure of Special Purpose Vehicles  
Variations of SPVs were frequently deployed by BEE companies, parent 
companies and financiers. These are (Nhlapo, 2008 p25): 
2.2.1.1. Equity Participation  
In this variation the BEE partner owns 100% A class shares in the SPV. The 
Corporate investor is given 100% B class shares (Nhlapo, 2008). Conditions 
attached to both the A class and B class shares may differ from SPV to SPV, 
however, a common objective among all SPV structures is to arrange classes 
of shares in a way that gives majority voting rights to the BEE partner. Shares 
in the parent company are owned by the corporate investor until the BEE 
partner has redeemed the B class shares.  
2.2.1.2. Equity Participation at a Discount 
In this variation a portion of the B class shares are sold to the BEE partner at 
a discount (Nhlapo, 2008), therefore the corporate investor or financier 
doesn’t own 100% B class shares. The portion of B class shares acquired at 
a discount allows the BEE partner to own some shares in the parent company 
from the onset.  
Financier Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) BEE Company 
Parent Company
Preference 
shares 
Required 
Funding 
Ordinary 
Shares 
Ordinary 
Shares 
Capital 
(Provided 
by 
Financier)
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2.2.1.3. Put Options Granted by Existing Shareholders 
The financier provides a loan that is used to acquire share in the parent 
company through a special purpose vehicle. The BEE partner owns 100% 
ordinary shares in the SPV, while the financier owns the 100% preference 
shares.  The loan extended to the BEE partner is guaranteed by a put option 
against shareholders in the parent company. In the event that the BEE 
partner is unable to redeem the preference shares owned by the financier, 
such shares can be sold by the financier to the investors in a parent company 
as per ‘put option’ agreement.  
2.2.1.4. Asset Securitisation  
In this variation the BEE partner uses the cash generating assets it has 
acquired to raise funds (Levitt, 2004). The cash generating assets are 
grouped together under a special purpose vehicle, which issues shares to the 
financier. The shares are paid back by the cash generated by the assets 
grouped under the special purpose vehicle. The assets backing the securities 
issued to investors are therefore separated from the parent company.   
2.2.1.5. The use of N-Ordinary Shares 
N-Ordinary shares are the same as ordinary shares, except that they give 
shareholders minimal or zero voting rights (JSE, 2014). N-Ordinary shares 
often trade at a discount to ordinary shares. Although they are likely to cost 
less, they pay out the same dividends as ordinary shares (JSE, 2014). By 
issuing N-Ordinary shares, owners of parent companies could have HDSA 
partners without losing the control of the company (Van Der Nest, 2004).N-
Ordinary shares are preferred by investors who want to benefit from dividend 
income but are not interested in voting rights or having control in the parent 
company. Other than dividend income, N-Ordinary shares also provide the 
benefit of capital gain.  
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2.2.1.6. Revenue Striping  
This variation enables the vendor to acquire all or part of the BEE partner’s 
share of production or dividend stream (Molapo, 2008).  
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2.3. FUNDING OF EMPOWERMENT TRANSACTIONS SINCE 
THE PROMULGATION OF BEE LEGISLATION 
In the early 2000s, the sustainability of funding models that were used in 
earlier BEE transactions came under scrutiny. Various stakeholders searched 
for more sustainable BEE funding models, with a view to have funding 
structures that would demonstrate sustainability from the onset (Ramathe, 
2009). 
The promulgation of BEE legislation in mining, particularly the Mining Charter, 
resulted in an increase in the number of empowerment transactions 
(Empowerdex, 2009, p4). As a result, demand for capital to finance BEE 
transactions grew. Third party financiers and government funding institutions 
could not provide adequate capital to meet the demand (Phillips, 2004); 
hence parent mining companies took the initiative to assist BEE companies 
with ‘in-house’ funding or facilitation of capital raising.  
The Mining Charter set clear HDSA ownership targets for mining companies 
to achieve, failing which parent mining companies would subject their 
businesses to substantial risk. The enforcement of the Mining Charter’s 
element of ownership by government provided additional motivation for 
parent mining companies to play a role in the funding of BEE transactions, 
particularly for the purchase of the parent company’s own shares.  
On the side of government, there was an acknowledgement of the limitations 
posed by the Companies Act on the achievement of the ownership 
transformation objective; subsequently, the government made necessary 
amendment to Section 38 of the Companies Act to enable funding of 
empowerment transactions by vendors (M’Paradzi, 2006).  
The 2008/2009 financial or liquidity crisis resulted in a credit crunch in the 
local and international financial institutions. As a result, South African banks 
tightened their credit policies (Daniels, 2010) thus also making it harder for 
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BEE companies to access credit. A combination of these and other factors 
resulted in a change in the method of funding BEE transactions. 
As opposed to models that were used before the promulgation of BEE laws, 
which relied mostly on dividends to pay preference shares dividends to 
financiers and to redeem such preference shares, the models used post BEE 
legislation relied on cash flow from both dividends and operating assets of 
parent companies (Ramathe, 2009). Also, BEE companies that grew capital 
from the first wave of BEE transactions had the capital already available to 
contribute sufficient cash to make transactions more sustainable, or even 
make straight purchases.  
Funding mechanisms that were used after the promulgation of BEE 
legislation in the mining sector were derived from options or derivatives, third 
party finance, vendor finance and convertible debt. In most instances hybrid 
instruments combining some or all of the above mentioned mechanisms were 
used. These are discussed below: 
2.3.1. Derivatives (Options) 
Options can be classified as neither debt nor equity as they derive their value 
from underlying assets, which are often in the form of other securities such as 
ordinary or preference shares (Obi, n.d). They are simply contracts, between 
the option writers and option holders, which specifically deal with underlying 
assets.  
In funding models that use options or derivatives, a BEE partner gets a call 
option, which is a right but not an obligation to buy shares in a parent 
company at an agreed future date and at a strike price, that is, the fixed price 
agreed on when the option was acquired. If the share price is higher than the 
strike price on the maturity date of the option, the BEE Company gets to 
benefit as it acquires the shares at a discount. If the share price is less than 
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the strike price the BEE partner or investor may choose not to exercise the 
call option as a loss would be made.  
According to Bowman Gilfillan (2001), typically, redeemable preference 
shares were issued to a BEE partner at the onset of the transaction. Each 
redeemable preference share had a call option attached to it. A BEE partner 
could receive the call option attached to shares as a grant from the parent 
company. The option could be linked to a performance criterion, which the 
BEE partner had to satisfy if the option was to remain valid (Woolley, 2005). If 
the call option got exercised the funding required by the BEE partner would 
be based on the strike price.   
In some instances, a parent company granted an equity stake to the BEE 
partner with an option for the parent company to buy back the equity stake at 
a maturity date if the BEE partner could not afford to pay for the shares 
(Ramaphosa et al, 2007). This allowed the BEE partner to have voting rights 
and economic participation from the onset. 
Disadvantages of options are: 
 Having a call option is not the same as owning shares in an underlying 
asset, therefore an investor holding an option may not have economic 
benefits until the option is exercised (Ramaphosa et al, 2007) 
 Share options could have restrictions on voting rights until the option is 
exercised 
 The BEE partner may be limited to buying shares under option 
(Woolley, 2005).  
The advantage of options is: 
 They offer the flexibility and the opportunity to benefit from the 
movement of the parent company’s share price.  
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2.3.2. Third Party Finance  
Third party funding consists mostly of debt funding. It is provided by 
commercial and investment banks, investment institutions such as Old Mutual 
and Sanlam, private equity firms, venture capital companies and special 
institutions such as Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), National 
Empowerment Fund (NEF) and Khula Enterprise Fund (Correia at Al, 2011).  
The challenges with third party funding provided by commercial banks, 
investment banks and investment institutions are the high interest rates and 
transaction costs (Nhlapo, 2008). This is attributed to the lack of collateral to 
back the funding provided by the concerned institutions. Furthermore, some 
BEE companies lack the expertise and experience in the businesses they are 
acquiring. Mothomogolo (2012) noted that South African banks in particular 
take a very conservative approach towards funding of BEE transactions in the 
mining sector. As a result, government established some institutions to fund 
transactions perceived to be risky by banks (IDC and NEF for example). 
A company that uses third party funding must ensure that the asset(s) it is 
acquiring generate sufficient income to pay the loan interests and the capital 
amount. In addition to servicing the loan obligation, the income generated by 
the asset(s) must cover working costs and surplus capital for reinvestment 
and growth (Ramaphosa et al, 2007). 
Third party finance may take a form of angel finance, which entails the 
extension of loan to a BEE partner that lacks collateral to back the funding 
(Ramaphosa et al, 2007). In angel finance, the financier obtains a large equity 
stake in the business and reduces the stake as the BEE partner pays back 
the loan (Ramaphosa et al, 2007).  
Other forms of third party funding are discussed below: 
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2.3.2.1. Leveraged Buy Outs (LBOs) 
Leveraged buy outs involve the use of financial leverage to complete the 
acquisition of a target company or portion of the company (Olsen, 2002). 
LBOs are normally structured with a combination of debt and equity; however, 
the debt component of capital is pushed significantly high to lower the cost of 
capital to an affordable level for the company acquiring assets, in this case a 
BEE partner. The high level of debt in the funding structure also allows the 
BEE company to acquire large assets without contributing a great deal of 
capital, which the BEE company may not have. Debts to equity ratios of up to 
9:1 are typical in LBOs. In principle, a company or assets of a company 
acquired through LOB pay for themselves (Olsen, 2002), hence the 
usefulness of this funding method in BEE transactions.  
If a BEE partner uses LBO to acquire assets from a parent company, the 
cash flow that will be generated from the acquired assets is used as collateral 
against the funding obtained from a third party financier. Targeted assets can 
also be used as collateral even before the assets are wholly owned by the 
BEE partner. This arrangement reduces the cost of capital to the BEE partner 
as the financier has access to assets and cash flow (Nhlapo, 2008). The cost 
of capital is furthermore lowered by the deductible tax in the debt component 
of the funding structure. 
The downside risk to LBOs is that a BEE company may be ‘over levered’, 
which results in large interest payments, thus limiting growth or even causing 
the company to default on its debt. Unforeseen events such as recession or 
change in regulatory environment can result in the BEE company struggling 
to make scheduled interest payments, thus leading to technical default 
(Olsen, 2002). If default occurs, equity ownership in the acquired assets may 
flow from the BEE Investor to the financier or debt funder.  
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2.3.2.2. Preference Shares  
In this model the financier offers funding to the BEE company in exchange for 
preference shares in the BEE company, thus the preference shares are used 
as security. In the event that the BEE company defaults on the loan, the 
preference shares are converted to ordinary shares (Nhlapo, 2008). 
Dividends from the parent company to the BEE partner are used to pay 
preference shares dividends to the financier and to redeem the preference 
shares. This arrangement is similar to the one used in SPVs, except that in 
this case no SPV is setup. The financier owns preference shares of the BEE 
company instead of the SPV’s preference shares. 
2.3.2.3. Mezzanine Financing 
Mezzanine finance is a mixture of debt and equity funding. It is subordinate to 
senior debt but senior to pure equity (Silbernagel and Vaitkunas, n.d). If this 
method of funding is used in a BEE transaction, a mezzanine funder extends 
debt to a BEE company with a right to convert debt to equity stake if the loan 
is not paid back on time or paid fully (Paul and Tierney, 2010). Alternatively, 
Mezzanine funding can be debt with high yielding coupon rates (Gevers and 
Boynton, n.d). This type of funding often requires little due diligence on the 
part of the lender and can be extended to entrepreneurs who have little or no 
collateral. As a result mezzanine finance is quick to obtain but it is relatively 
expensive compared to senior debt provided by banks and private equity 
investors (Ramathe, 2009).  Companies that invest in Mezzanine debt often 
require returns of 20% or more (Paul and Tierney, 2010). 
It is treated like equity on a company’s balance sheet, therefore a company 
that has Mezzanine debt can still obtain pure debt funding without appearing 
to have excessive gearing. Since mezzanine debt is viewed as equity, having 
a mezzanine funder could help a BEE company secure loan funding from 
banks with relative ease as banks consider mezzanine funders as reputable 
partners to companies that they lend capital (Silbernagel and Vaitkunas, n.d). 
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Figure 2.2 below indicates priority of mezzanine debt compared to other 
forms of debt. 3 categories of mezzanine debt are indicated.   
 
Figure 2.2: Priority of mezzanine debt compared to other types of funding 
Source: Silbernagel and Vaitkunas, n.d, p2 
A blend of debt and equity in the mezzanine structures provides both the 
lender and the BEE company with the flexibility to manage their respective 
risk and return profiles. Its structure can be tailor made to suit the needs of 
both the BEE partner as well as the target mining company’s cash flow 
profiles (Ramathe, 2009). It is a dynamic funding model, normally used when 
there are reasonable growth prospects and cash flow generation by acquired 
assets. A typical mezzanine transaction is five to eight years, with possibilities 
of the funder exiting the transaction early (Silbernagel and Vaitkunas, n.d).  
2.3.3. Vendor Finance  
Vendor financing is when funding of an empowerment transaction is provided 
by the parent mining company (Ramaphosa et al, 2007). This method of 
funding allows the BEE Company to receive assets before it has the money 
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to pay for such assets. It was not popular prior to the amendment of Section 
38 of the Companies Act, which precluded any company from financing the 
purchase of its own shares (M’Paradzi, 2006).  
The use of vendor financing gained momentum subsequent to numerous deal 
failures that were caused by the use of SPVs. Ramathe (2009) highlighted 
vendor financing as being critical to the success of the second wave of BEE 
transactions. Vendor finance or facilitation can take various forms including: 
 Provision of loan guarantees by vendors to third party funders on 
behalf of BEE partners. 
 Vendors selling shares to BEE companies at a discount, thus reducing 
the overall costs associated with the BEE transactions. Some deals 
have been transacted at discounts of up to 40% to the market price 
(Molapo, 2008). Access to funding becomes relatively easy when a 
BEE company obtains shares at a discount. 
 Agreeing on a set dividend payment plan subject to availability of 
profits and cash in order to enable the BEE investor to service debt 
(Ramathe, 2009) 
 Earn-out structures i.e. Where the BEE investor’s acquisition of equity 
is tied to achievement of certain performance measures in the target 
company (Ramathe, 2009). This method of facilitating BEE funding 
reduces dilution of shares to existing shareholders and requires 
minimal cash injection upfront (Woolley, 2005) 
 Deferred share instruments: In this method of vendor facilitation, the 
BEE partner becomes a holder of ordinary shares with voting rights in 
the parent company; however the BEE partner does not receive 
dividends until it demonstrates value addition. In some instances, 
dividends are deferred until the value of deferred dividends is equal to 
the amount the BEE partner would have paid to acquire the ordinary 
shares (Bowman Gilfillan, 2001). Performance of the BEE partner 
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could be linked to a threshold in cash flow generation, beyond which 
dividends will be paid. 
Vendor facilitation in any of the above mentioned forms results in the BEE 
partner obtaining cheaper financing because financiers moderate risk due to 
commitment from the parent company. Such commitment offers some form of 
security (Nhlapo, 2008).  Vendors commit to making deals work because they 
assume some risk, furthermore, failure of a BEE deal results in a loss of BEE 
ownership accreditation to the vendor (Ramathe, 2009). The level of 
commitment by parent companies has been demonstrated by rescue 
packages that were provided by some vendors to their BEE partners when 
they were struggling to service their debt obligations.  
2.3.4. Convertible Debt or Convertible Debentures  
Convertible debentures are used to fund BEE transactions when interest 
rates are high since convertible debentures are cheaper than non-convertible 
bonds (Levitt, 2004). Convertible debentures can be changed into a specified 
number of ordinary shares subject to terms and conditions that were agreed 
on when the funding was obtained. The conversion feature in this funding 
model makes it cheaper as it provides the funder with the opportunity of 
converting the bond to ordinary shares should the funder choose to exercise 
the option (Gitman, 2000).  
If this funding mechanism is use, the BEE partner pays a fixed interest or 
coupon rate (indicated as CR% in figure 2.4) to the debenture holder until the 
maturity date of the debenture is reached. Upon maturity of the debenture a 
principal amount is paid to the lender. Alternatively, the debenture holder can 
choose to exercise the option of acquiring shares instead of receiving the 
principle amount.  
If the share price is greater than the conversion price on the date of maturity, 
the debenture holder could exercise the option to acquire shares as the value 
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of the shares to be acquired would exceed the principal amount owed; 
therefore the share would be acquired at a discount. If the share price is less 
than the conversion price the holder of the debenture will request the 
payment of the principal debt owned (See illustration in figure 2.4). If the BEE 
partner fails to pay the interests or the principal debt, the lender can force the 
BEE partner into liquidation and recover the money owed from the sale of the 
assets (Molapo, 2008). 
 
Figure 2.4: Illustration of convertible bond funding using a 3 year European 
convertible bond. 
Source: Southern African Treasurer - Risk Management (Martin and Bhyat, 
n.d, p32) 
2.3.5. Build Own Transfer or Build Own Operate 
An asset belonging to a parent mining company is legally owned and run by a 
BEE partner for a specified duration, after which the asset is transferred back 
to the parent company (Levitt, 2004). 
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2.4. FUNDING MODELS THAT FAILED WITH THE CHANGING 
MARKET AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT  
The 1998 and 2008 crises in the financial markets resulted in the loss of 
value in mining companies’ stocks and reduced liquidity in the financial 
markets. Consequently, some weaknesses in various BEE funding 
mechanisms were exposed. The funding models that were used prior to the 
promulgation of the BEE legislation in the mining industry were tested by the 
Asian financial crisis of 1998.  
Funding models that were used after the promulgation of BEE legislation 
were tested by the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008. This crisis caused 
share prices of mining companies to fall by 60-80%, leaving 90% of BEE 
Companies ‘out of the money’ (Mondi, 2009 cited in Mining Weekly, 2009) 
(Figure 2.5).  
 
 
Figure 2.5: Value drop in the FTSE/JSE Resources 20 index due to the 1998 
and 2008 financial crises 
Source: Financial Times, 2014 
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In addition to the abovementioned financial crises, regulatory changes that 
came in 2004, 2007 and 2008 within the mining industry also resulted in 
notable modifications in the BEE funding landscape. Enforcement of BEE 
legislation resulted in early BEE funding models falling out of favour as the 
main driver of BEE transactions changed from anticipation of political change 
to compliance with regulatory requirements. Changes in the laws that govern 
the funding of acquisition of shares created flexibility, thus causing rigid 
funding structures to be shunned. Funding mechanisms that failed as a result 
of the financial crises and regulatory changes are discussed below. 
2.4.1. Special Purpose Vehicles  
Special purpose vehicles were not successful in the early days of BEE. This 
was due to the manner in which SPVs were structured and unfavourable 
market conditions (Bowman Gilfillan, 2001). SPVs work when the market is 
bullish, but fail when there is an economic down turn. They succeed if parent 
companies’ shares were obtained at a discount and thereafter grow 
exponentially (Phillips, 2004); hence they lack the flexibility to stay 
sustainable in different market conditions. According to BusinessMap (1999 
cited in Phillips, 2004, p86) SPVs have higher risk due to: 
 Lack of liquidity and flexibility within the SPV structures 
 Longer investment term 
 Loss of voting control 
These models were implemented at before tax interest rates of up to 18% 
(Vernon, 2010) due to the apparent high risk that was associated with BEE 
companies then; hence they failed to effect desired change in the transfer of 
ownership to HDSAs. According to Barnes (2013, Cited in BusinessDay Live, 
2013), the average dividend yield over the past 20 (1993-2013) years was 
3.8%-4%, and the prime overdraft rate was above 15% for most of that time. 
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This indicates that dividends would not be sufficient to cover loan interests 
associated with SPVs. Thus, SPVs proved to be unsustainable as they relied 
on dividend payments and share price appreciation to succeed.  
The 1998 Asian crisis was characterised by high interest rates and declining 
dividends thus leading to the collapse of SPV funded transactions. Assets 
that were acquired by BEE companies were subsequently relinquished to 
financiers as BEE investors failed to redeem preference shares (Van der 
Nest, 2004).  
The 2008 financial crisis also exposed further weaknesses in the SPV funding 
models. The collapse of the financial markets left many BEE companies 
heavily indebted (Jacks, 2010).  
SPVs allowed HDSA investors to obtain equity in parent companies without 
assuming any downside risk (Phillips, 2004). As a result, many BEE investors 
did not have the necessary commitment to make the transactions successful 
(Bowman Gilfillan, 2001). Rather, their focus was split across a number of 
transactions, with the consequence that there was little interest in taking part 
in the operations of respective businesses.  
In 2009, the DMR attributed mining companies’ failure to achieve the 
ownership target set by the mining charter partly to the use of SPVs (DMR, 
2009). Due to the structure of SPVs, mining assets that were intended to be 
transferred to HDSAs were tied up in loan agreements (DMR, 2009). The 
DMR (2009) stated that the majority of BEE deals had negative net value due 
to high interest rates on loans and lower than expected dividend flows. 
2.4.2 Third Party Funding with Recourse  
Third party loans that are provided with onerous terms compromise the 
sustainability of BEE transactions from the onset. Nlhapo (2008) and 
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Engelbrecht (2007) rated third party funding low in terms of the preference of 
use and sustainability of BEE transactions (Figure 2.6 and 2.7).  
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2.5. FUNDING MODELS THAT REMAINED SUSTAINABLE 
REGARDLESS OF MARKET AND REGULATORY CHANGES  
2.5.1. Vendor Finance  
The sustainability of vendor finance emanated from the fact that, while it was 
costly to the vendors, it was considerably cheap to the BEE partners due to 
low interest rates and discounts offered when assets were acquired by HDSA 
companies. Furthermore, it provided more flexibility and often had funding 
terms that were less burdensome as vendors would benefit from the success 
of the transactions. 
It gained attractiveness after the Asian crisis, which exposed severe 
weaknesses in funding models that were used then. It was further supported 
by the amendment of the companies act.  
BEE funding models, such as SPVs and funding models with lock-in 
structures came under severe scrutiny post the 2008 financial crisis. Vendor 
finance however, was still identified as a viable alternative to BEE funding 
models that failed (Ernst & Young, 2010). According to the Ernst & Young 
BEE report (2010), “Fully vendor-financed deals may navigate the harsh 
economic cycles better than those with third-party financing”.   
A survey conducted by Nlhapo (2008) indicated that vendor finance was the 
most preferred method of funding BEE transactions in 2008. See figure 2.6 
below. 
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Figure 2.6: Preference of BEE funding models according to a survey 
conducted by Nlhapo (2008), p51.  
Engelbrecht (2007) noted that there is a constant tension between the 
sustainability of a BEE transaction and the cost of such transaction to a 
vendor. He indicated that, as a general rule, the lower the cost of a 
transaction to a vendor the lower the certainty of its financial outcome and its 
sustainability (Figure 2.7). Therefore, vendor finance has been key to 
improving the sustainability of BEE transactions. It effectively protects the 
BEE companies from exposure to the financial markets. In this way success 
is more often possible.  
 
Figure 2.7: Relationship between the type of funding and sustainability of a 
BEE transaction (Source: Engelbrecht, 2007). 
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2.5.2. Leverage Buyouts  
According to Bravura (Cited in BusenessDay, 2010) BEE leveraged buyout 
model is a more sustainable method of implementing BEE ownership 
transactions than SPVs.  Bravura argues that LBOs are sustainable because 
the value of the company is reduced to a nominal amount with the result that 
the black participants do not need to raise external finance for the transaction 
(BusinessDay, 2010). Since LBOs can be 100% vendor facilitated, an LBO 
financed transaction does not put unnecessary strain on the balance sheet of 
the vendor company, while also facilitating the debt-free empowerment of a 
BEE entity (Vernon, 2010 cited in BusinessDay, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
2.6. CONTRIBUTION OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO 
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF BEE FUNDING 
MODELS 
Two regulatory interventions in the mining industry can be noted to have 
caused significant changes to the BEE landscape. First was the promulgation 
of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) in 2002 
and subsequently the Mining Charter in 2004. The Mining Charter provides 
the legal framework to prescribe, monitor and enforce the BEE objectives.  
Second was the amendment of the Companies Act. The amendment of 
section 38 of the Companies Act no. 61 of 1973 provided a broader pool from 
which BEE companies could access funding. The Amended Companies Act 
created an enabling environment for parent mining companies to play a 
bigger role in terms of facilitating the acquisition of their shares by BEE 
companies.   
2.6.1. The Mining Charter 
Before the promulgation of the Mining Charter, black economic empowerment 
in the mining sector was ‘voluntary’ and uncoordinated. Mining companies 
were not compelled to participate in BEE. The Mining Charter therefore 
provided a legal framework for government to enforce transformation. As a 
result of the requirements of the ownership element of the mining charter, the 
number of empowerment transactions in the South African mining sector 
increased. 
Vendor finance, which was identified as the sustainable method of funding 
BEE transactions, became increasingly popular after the mining charter was 
promulgated.  
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2.6.2. The Companies Act  
Section 38.(1) of the COMPANIES ACT NO. 61 OF 1973 hindered progress 
in the implementation of the Mining Charter as it prevented parent mining 
companies from financing the acquisition of or subscription for their own 
shares. Section 38 (1) of the Companies Act states that: 
“No company shall give, whether directly or indirectly, and whether by means 
of a loan, guarantee, the provision of security or otherwise, any financial 
assistance for the purpose of or in connection with a purchase or subscription 
made or to be made by any person of or for any shares of the company, or 
where the company is a subsidiary company, of its holding company.” 
As a result, complex funding structures in the form of SPVs were designed to 
work around this provision of the act; and still, possibilities of contravening the 
act existed. In the event that a contravention would occur, the BEE 
transaction could be deemed void and directors of the company could face 
prosecution (M’Paradzi, 2006). Thus, not only was section 38.(1) a hindrance 
to the implementation of the Mining Charter, but it also exposed parent mining 
companies to financial and legal risks. The biggest impact of this section of 
the Companies Act was the widespread use and subsequent failures of SPVs 
prior to 2008.   
The aforementioned impact was discussed in details in section 2.2.1 and 
2.4.1. Deferred shares instruments were also used to avoid contravention of 
section 38.(1) of the Companies Act (M’Paradzi, 2006).  
On 14 December 2007 the amendment of section 38.(1) of the Companies 
Act No. 61 of 1973 took effect, hence giving permission to parent companies 
to offer financial assistance for the acquisition of or subscription for their 
shares (Bowman Gilfillan, 2001).  
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The New Companies Act NO. 71 OF 2008 was promulgated in April 2009. 
This Act replaced the whole of Companies Act No. 61 of 1973. Section 44.(2) 
of the New Companies Act has replaced section 38.(1) of the Companies Act 
No. 61 of 1973, which regulated the  financial assistance to purchase shares 
of a company or holding company. Section 44.(2) of the New Companies Act 
states that: 
“Except to the extent that the memorandum of incorporation of a company 
provides otherwise, the board may authorise the company to provide financial 
assistance by way of a loan, guarantee, the provision of security or otherwise 
to any person for the purpose of, or in connection with, the subscription of any 
option, or any securities, issued or to be issued by the company or a related 
or inter-related company, or for the purchase of any securities of the company 
or a related or inter-related company, subject to subsections (3) and (4).” 
This provision of the New Companies Act has from 2009 removed vendor 
funding restrictions that were caused by section 38.(1) of the 1973 
Companies Act. Parent companies can now provide financial assistance and 
other forms of vendor facilitation to their BEE partners. It’s no longer 
necessary to use complex funding structures such as SPVs to avoid 
contravention of the Companies Act. In addition to removing funding 
restrictions, the New Companies Act provides greater flexibility to structuring 
of BEE transactions (Bluechip Journal, 2012).  
The flexibility of structuring a BEE transaction, and the degree to which a 
parent company can offer financial assistance can only be limited by the 
parent company’s memorandum of incorporation (see section 44.(2) of the 
Companies Act No. 71 of 2008). The new act allows for any number of 
classes of shares to be issued with any set of preferences, rights and 
limitations. According to Kruger (2012, cited in Bluechip Journal, 2012), the 
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flexibility comes from the lack of definition or specific provision for preference 
shares, as opposed to ordinary or equity shares.  
2.7. CONCLUSION OF LITERATURE REVIEW  
Prior to the promulgation of BEE legislation in the mining sector, a 
combination of third party funding and SPV structures was the preferred 
mechanism of financing BEE transactions. After the mining charter was 
promulgated in 2004, innovative funding structures emerged as mining 
companies sought various alternative ways of complying with the mining 
charter’s element of ownership. This was because Section 38(1) of the 
companies act constrained the funding of BEE transactions as it limited the 
extent to which vendors could finance the acquisition of their own shares. 
This section of the Companies Act was amended in December 2007 and later 
replaced by section 44.(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. This change in 
the regulatory framework resulted in the subsequent widespread use of 
vendor funding and other vendor facilitation mechanisms. 
The 1998 Asian crisis exposed underlying weaknesses in funding methods 
that were used prior to the promulgation of the BEE legislation. SPVs and 
third party funding with onerous loan terms caused failure of BEE 
transactions as market conditions turned for the worst.  
The 2008 financial crisis further exposed that SPVs and third party funding 
with onerous terms were not sustainable. Vendor finance, however, proved to 
be sustainable even in unfavourable market conditions as vendors carry more 
risk and thus protect the BEE partners against adverse market situations. The 
sustainability of vendor finance increases with the increasing cost to the 
vendors.  
Due to the regulatory and market factors discussed in this literature review 
chapter and objectives discussed in chapter 1, this study will therefore 
focuses on 3 time periods:  
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 Prior 2004 
 2004 to 2007 and  
 2008 to 2012.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
COLLECTION  
3.1. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This research was designed to rely predominantly on the collection and 
analysis of quantitative data. The collection of accurate data necessitated 
detailed case studies of the transactions, so, the case study method was 
used as an integral part of the research. 
At the time of conducting this research there existed a number of research 
reports on the subject of BEE funding; however, almost all research had 
followed the qualitative research approach. Interviews were conducted with 
respondents, alternatively, questionnaires were sent to respondents to 
capture descriptive data. The collected data was then analysed qualitatively 
to determine the effectiveness of BEE transactions and associated funding 
models. The quantitative research and analysis method was avoided often 
due to the unwillingness of mining corporations to disclose important deal 
structure and funding information (Molapo, 2008). Also, in the early days of 
BEE, there was no adequate data to support quantitative research. 
Without undermining practical constraints highlighted by other researchers as 
mentioned above, this research takes a different approach by focusing more 
on the quantitative methods. The importance of this work is that an effort is 
made to make a quantitative assessment.  
A quantitative approach will eliminate bias which may be inherent in the 
responses provided by respondents in qualitative research. Furthermore, this 
research method offers the advantage of projecting the results forward. 
Therefore, the results of the analysis could be used in future to pre-empt the 
sustainability of BEE transactions before the transactions are concluded 
(provided sufficient information is obtained to guarantee a high level of 
statistical confidence on the results).  
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Quantitative analysis of BEE funding models comprises regression analysis, 
hypothesis testing and trend analysis. Regression analysis examines the 
existence of correlation between various funding mechanisms and the 
successes or failures of BEE transactions. Hypothesis testing considers the 
significance of correlation, if such correlation exists. Trend analysis examines 
the performance of different funding methods throughout the three BEE eras 
or regulatory regimes highlighted in Chapter 2.  
3.2. DATA COLLECTION  
3.2.1. Sampling Design  
As the research seeks to establish the sustainability of funding methods used 
in BEE transactions in the entire South African mining industry, it is important 
that the study becomes representative. The representativeness of the 
research in turn depends on the size of the data/sample used in the study. 
But, it would be costly and time consuming to acquire all information available 
on mining BEE transactions. Accordingly, a few transactions would be 
sampled and analysed. These transactions would constitute a sample 
population that should be representative of the population of all BEE 
transactions in the mining industry. This would permit inferences to be made 
regarding the behaviour of the entire population. For the sample population to 
be representative the following conditions have to be satisfied: 
 The sample population must be of the correct size 
 Transactions collected as part of the sample population must be 
collected randomly 
The manner in which the above mentioned conditions were satisfied in the 
data collection process is discussed below: 
 
 
48 
 
3.2.1.1. Correct Sample Size:  
The correct sample size was calculated using the sample size formula as 
specified by Godden (2004). 
𝑛 =  
[(𝑧2 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑞) +  𝑀𝐸2] 
[𝑀𝐸2 + (𝑧2 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑞)/𝑁 ]
 
Where n is the size of the sample. 
z = Z value corresponding to the desired confidence level of the results 
obtained in the analysis. A confidence level of 80% was chosen. That is, if 
different sample populations were gathered repetitively, 80% of the time the 
same results would be obtained. The Z value corresponding to 80% 
confidence level = 1.28.  
p = the percentage picking a point.  In this study a P value of 50%, which 
represents a worst case scenario, would be used. Considering a population of 
transactions, the assumption here is that 50% of the transactions would be 
sustainable and the other 50% unsustainable (similar to a qualitative survey 
that requires respondents to respond with a “yes” or “no” answer; 50% of the 
respondents would say yes and 50% would say no). 
q = (p-1) 
ME (Margin of Error) = Confidence interval expressed as a decimal. In this 
study a confidence interval of 10% was used, which is acceptable considering 
that the models derived from the study will not be used for forecasting 
purposes.  
N = Population size (total number of BEE transaction in the South African 
mining industry). The total number of mining BEE transactions that occurred 
since the inception of BEE to 2012 could not be obtained from the DMR. A 
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population of 351 BEE transactions was estimated based on the following 
calculation: 
Empowerdex provided the actual number of transactions that were concluded 
from 2004-2008; 115 transactions occurred. The highest number of 
transactions (34) occurred in 2007, which is the peak of the recent commodity 
boom cycle (Figure 1.1). It was assumed that not more than 34 transactions 
occurred each year from 2009 to 2012. This is a fair assumption since the 
number of transactions decreased during the financial crisis period and the 
effects of the crisis were still felt post 2009. So the maximum number of 
transactions from 2009 to 2012 was estimated to be 136 (34 x 4). It was 
assumed that an average of 10 transactions per year occurred between 1994 
and 2004 as BEE had not yet picked up momentum. This gives a total of 100 
transactions for the period of 1994 to 2003. The total number of transactions 
was thus estimated as: 
Number of transactions = 1994 to 2003 transactions + 2004 to 2008 
transaction + 2009 to 2012 transactions  
= 100 + 115 + 136 = 351 
The minimum number of samples required for the study was calculated as 
follows: 
𝑛 =  
[(𝑧2 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑞) + 𝑀𝐸2] 
[𝑀𝐸2 + (𝑧2 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑞)/𝑁 ]
 
n = [(1.282 x 0.5 x 0.5) + 0.12] / [0.12 + (1.282 x 0.5 x 0.5)/351] 
= [0.4196]/[0.0112] 
= 38 
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Thus for the purpose of this study 38 samples will constitute the correct 
sample size. These samples will be divided into the three critical periods as 
discussed in Chapter 2 (before 2004, 2004-2007 and 2008-2012).  
The parameters chosen above for the calculation of the sample size mean 
that one would be 80% sure that the results of the analysis are correct ± 10% 
(confidence interval). This level of confidence and the confidence intervals 
are appropriate for the objectives of this research as stated in chapter 1.4. 
Also refer to chapter 4.6.1 for further details on the appropriateness of 80% 
confidence level for this research.  
3.2.1.2. Transactions Included in the Sample must be Chosen Randomly 
Random sampling is necessary for external validity (Fox et al, 2009). If the 
transactions are not chosen randomly the results of the analysis cannot be 
applied to the entire population (BEE transactions in the South African mining 
industry). In this research standard random sampling techniques such as 
simple and stratified sampling could not be used due to the difficulty of 
accessing information directly from mining enterprises or the market.  
Nevertheless, the selection of transactions was random as all transactions, 
for which the relevant information was fully available in the public domain, 
had a fair chance of being included in the sample population.  
The research used information that was freely available in the public domain. 
Thus, the only bias would emanate from the fact that transactions that were 
kept confidential by respective enterprises would not have the chance of 
being sampled.  
3.2.2. Data Collection Method  
Two approaches were used for data collection. First, data was collected from 
sources available in the public domain. This data is both primary and 
secondary data as some of it was collected from research conducted by other 
51 
 
researchers and reporters, and the rest was collected from websites of 
relevant mining companies. Parallel to that process, attempt was made to 
collect primary data directly from selected mining companies making use of 
questionnaires. However, this attempt was not successful. 
3.2.2.1. Data Collected from Sources Available in the Public Domain 
Data was collected predominantly using the internet from websites of 
reporters, mining companies, SENS documents, research publications and 
other public databases. A total of 118 transactions were considered 
(Appendix 1).  These transactions were randomly selected based on the 
information available in the public domain.  
The majority of transactions considered (46%) happened between 2004 and 
2007 (Table 3.1). This coincides with the period in which commodity prices 
were booming. There was a large number of transactions then, as mining 
companies and BEE entrepreneurs were optimistic about the future of the 
mining businesses. There was money available to fund the transactions as 
well. See appendix 1-4 for details of BEE transactions used in the study.  
  
Before 
2004 
2004 
to 
2007 
2008 
to 
2012 
Total  
Percentage 
of Total  
Adequate information available 10 23 17 50 42% 
Partial information available 3 4 3 10 8% 
No information on funding 
structure 
19 27 12 58 49% 
Total 32 54 32 118 100% 
Percentage of Total  27% 46% 27%     
Tab le  3 .1 :  Summary  o f  da ta  co l lec t ion  
Information on the details of the transactions (sources of funding and 
structures of the transactions) was very limited in the public domain. Of the 
118 transactions considered, 42% of the transactions (50) had adequate 
details available (appendix 2 to appendix 4). However, according to Godden 
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(2004) sample size formula, 50 samples would be adequate to cover a 
population of 500 samples and provide a confidence level of 85%, which is 
higher than the desired 80% confidence level for this research. Hence 50 
samples are adequate for this research.  
9% of the transactions had partial information available and 49% of the 
transactions had no information on funding sources or structures available. 
Figure 3.2 and 3.3 indicate the breakdown of the transactions in terms of the 
availability of information. 
 
Figure 3.2: Spread of Mining BEE transactions 
 
Figure 3.3: Breakdown of transactions in terms of availability of information 
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3.2.2.2. Data Collected from Mining Companies using Questionnaires  
Transactions considered included a range of parent and BEE mining 
companies, from major producers to junior mining companies. A 
questionnaire was sent to respective companies, DMR and COM to acquire 
information. There was no adequate response from the abovementioned 
parties. A copy of the questionnaire is shown in appendix 5.  
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF 
RESULTS  
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
Funding models consist of two elements – namely, sources of funding and 
structures of funding. The data that was gathered consisted mainly of 
information regarding sources of funding. There were insufficient details 
regarding the structures of transactions. As a result the analysis focuses on 
sources of funding (Figure 4.1).  
Preference share instruments were used in a number of transactions; so this 
mechanism of funding was included in the analysis. As preference share 
instruments were used largely in conjunction with third party financing, the 
two were linked in the analysis of results.  
 
Figure 4.1: Sources and mechanisms of funding used in BEE transactions 
The analysis focuses on the frequency of use of the funding methods, the 
impact of changes in the regulatory environment on the successes and 
failures of BEE transactions, the influence of the sizes of various sources of 
funding on the success of funding structures, regression analysis and 
significance testing. These are discussed in turn below.  
Vendor Third Party
Self Funding 
/Equity
Donation Loan Donation Loan
Preference 
Shares
Preference 
Shares
Sources and Mechanisms 
of funding
55 
 
4.2. FREQUENCY OF USE OF VARIOUS FUNDING METHODS  
A frequency analysis was done to highlight funding methods that were 
favourable during the periods under study.  
All funding sources and mechanisms were used for a combined total of 77 
times in the sample population. On average, Vendor finance was the most 
favoured method of funding BEE transactions from 1992 to 2012 with a total 
frequency of 28 transactions, constituting 36%. However, only 2 transactions 
in the data consisted of vendor finance before 2004. The highest percentage 
use occurred in the 2008 – 2012 era with a 52% frequency of use.   
  Vendor Third Party 
Loan 
Equity (self) Preference 
shares 
Before 2004 18% 64% 9% 9% 
2004-2007 32% 27% 29% 12% 
2008-2012 52% 16% 24% 8% 
Total 36% 29% 25% 10% 
Tab le  4 .2 .1 :  F requency  o f  use  summary  tab le  
 
 
Figure 4.2.1: Frequency of use (2004-2012) 
28
22
19
8
Freequency of use of various sources & mechanisms of 
funding
Vendor
Third Party Loan
Equity (self)
Preference shares
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Third party funding was the second most predominant funding method. It was 
used largely in the early days of BEE and it’s frequency of used decreased 
over time. Equity and preference shares were used the least frequent at total 
percentage frequencies of 25% and 10% respectively.   
The effect of regulatory change (promulgation of Mining Charter, amendment 
of Companies Act and promulgation of New Companies Act) on the use of 
vendor finance can be observed on table 4.2.1. There has been a steady 
increase in the frequency of vendor finance throughout the three periods. This 
indicates that vendor finance is very reliant on regulatory intervention.  
The frequency of third party funding decreased steadily over the three 
periods. This is attributed to the increase in the use of both vendor and equity 
funding, which were influenced by the regulatory intervention and favourable 
economic climate before 2008. The established trends show that solutions to 
practical challenges that were experienced with the use of vendor and equity 
finance in the early days of BEE were found and implemented.  
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4.3. IMPACT OF CHANGE IN THE REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT ON THE SUCCESS OF BEE TRANSACTIONS 
4.3.1. Trend of Various Funding Methods through Regulatory Regimes  
There was a steep increase in the total value of BEE transactions concluded 
after 2004 (Figure 4.3.1). This can be attributed to two key factors. The first 
one is the introduction of the Mining Charter, which was promulgated in 2004. 
After BEE law was legislated, transformation of the mining industry was no 
longer left to the discretion of mining enterprises; rather, it was made a legal 
requirement with clearly defined consequences for enterprises that would fail 
to comply. Thus the introduction of a legal framework within which mining 
BEE dealings would be conducted added an impetus in the BEE landscape. 
Second, the global mining industry was going through a high commodity price 
cycle so there was liquidity available to support BEE activities. 
Prior to 2004, 89% of BEE deals’ funding by value came from third party 
financiers. The contribution of third party funding dropped to 27% in the 
period of 2004 – 2007. A further 10% drop in the amount of third party funding 
used occurred in the period of 2008 – 2012. Third party funding was 
predominant in the early days of BEE (Prior 2004) for two reasons: 
 Insufficient capital on the part of BEE entrepreneurs to enable them to 
contribute significant equity when acquiring shares from parent mining 
companies.  
 Vendor finance was not widely used due to legal constraints. Also, 
BEE legislation had not been promulgated yet. As such, the 
requirements and implications of failing to comply with the BEE 
legislation were not clear to mining companies; hence their reluctance 
to contribute money for the acquisition of their own shares.  
This trend of third party funding is consistent with observations made by other 
researchers as discussed in the literature review chapter.  
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Figure 4.3.1: Trend of sources and mechanisms of funding BEE transactions 
 
Figure 4.3.2: Trend of sources and mechanisms of funding BEE transactions 
(% of total value) 
Vendor finance accounted for only 3.2% of funding of BEE transactions prior 
to 2004 (Figure 4.3.2). During the period of 2004 to 2007, it increased to 
33.4%. This period coincides with the amendment of the COMPANIES ACT 
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NO. 61 OF 1973 which allowed mining companies to fund the acquisition of 
their own shares. Vendor finance further increased to 59.5% of transactions 
by Rand value in the period of 2008-2012. This increase is line with 
expectations as the period of 2008-2012 was fully exposed to the new 
COMPANIES ACT NO. 71 OF 2008 as opposed to the 2004 – 2007 period; 
this period was only exposed to the amended companies act in the latter 
year. From 2008-2012 there were no restrictions associated with the use of 
vendor finance.  
The 2008-2012 period is post the global financial crisis; therefore equity and 
third party finance dried up in this period. As a result parent mining 
companies had to provide vendor finance to BEE companies. This period is 
also closer to the 2014 Mining Charter compliance review by the DMR; hence 
the initiative by mining companies to align their compliance to the 26% BEE 
ownership target. 
There was almost no equity funding (0.5% of transactions funding by rand 
value) in BEE transactions prior to 2004 as BEE entrepreneurs lacked the 
capital to self-fund acquisition of shares from parent mining companies. 
Equity funding increased to 31%, its highest contribution to BEE finance, in 
the period of 2004-2007. During that period BEE entrepreneurs gained profits 
due to the commodity prices boom that started in the early 2000s. As a 
results money generated from sharp increases in share prices of mining 
enterprises and economic rent was used to acquire new assets. The Anglo 
Platinum_Mvelaphada Resources and African Rainbow Minerals_Xtrata BEE 
deals, which happened in 2007 and 2006 respectively, are a case in point. 
The two transactions were valued at R4 billion and R785 million respectively. 
The funding structure of Anglo Platinum_Mvelaphada Resources deal 
consisted of 38% equity, whereas the African Rainbow Minerals_Xtrata deal 
consisted of 49% equity or self-funding.  
60 
 
In the case of Mvelaphanda Resources, the profit earned from the sale of 
Goldfields shares – which were acquired in 2004 – was used to acquire 
shares in Northam Platinum and the Booysendal project. African Rainbow 
Minerals (ARM) used profits from the gold assets that were acquired from 
Anglogold Ashanti in 1998.  
The use of preference shares increased marginally from 7.6% prior 2004 to 
8.9% in the period of 2004 – 2007. The highest percentage of 20% occurred 
in the period of 2008 – 2012. Preference shares were generally used in 
conjunction with third party finance, thus it was expected that preference 
share instruments would show a declining trend from 2004 to 2012 as this is 
the case with third party finance. However, the opposite is a case. This is due 
to two transactions that were concluded between Anglo Platinum, Anoorag 
and Wesizwe Platinum in the period of 2008 – 2012. The two transactions 
accounted for a total preference shares amount of R3.5 billion.  
Table 4.3.1 below gives a breakdown of the contribution of various funding 
methods (R million) in financing of BEE transactions from 1992 to 2012.  
Sources & 
Mechanisms of 
Funding (R mil) 
Vendor 
Third 
Party 
Loan 
Equity 
(self) 
Preference 
shares 
Total 
Before 2004 100 2,744 15 234 3,093 
2004-2007 15,300 12,119 14,297 4,068 45,784 
2008-2013 10,499 2,766 907 3,462 17,633 
Total  25,899 17,629 15,219 7,764 66,510 
Tab le  4 .3 .1 :  Amoun t  o f  va r ious  sources /mechan isms o f  
f und ing  in  BEE  t ransac t ions  inc luded  in  the  s tudy  (1992  –  
2012 )  
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4.3.2. Impact of Observed Trends on Sustainability of Transactions  
In order to examine the influence of various sources and mechanisms of 
funding on the successes or failures of BEE transactions the following was 
done: 
 The number of transactions were split into the 3 periods highlighted 
above  
 Percentages of successful or sustainable transactions were calculated 
for each period 
 The calculated percentages were compared to the trends of various 
funding sources as shown in figure 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.  
On average, 76% of BEE transactions concluded between 1992 and 2012 
were successful (Figure 4.3.3). Sustainable transactions increased from 70% 
to 78.3% from the first BEE era (prior to 2004) to the second one (2004-
2007). Therefore, the promulgation of the Mining Charter, which occurred in 
2004, did not necessarily result in a significantly higher number of successful 
transactions as much as it caused a spike in the volume of transactions 
(Figure 4.3.1). The 8.3% increase in the proportion of successful transactions 
could partially be attributed to the reduction of third party funding from 88.7% 
to 26.5%, the increase of both equity and vendor finance as shown in figure 
4.3.2 and the more favourable commodity cycle. Notwithstanding, the rapid 
increase in the proportion of vendor finance can be attributed partly to the 
promulgation of the Mining Charter.  
62 
 
 
Figure 4.3.3: Percentage of sustainable transactions from 2004 – 2012 
There was a slight reduction (1.8 percentage points) in the number of 
successful transactions from the second to the third period although the 
percentage of vendor finance increased by 26% in the same period. It was 
also expected that the reduction of third party finance during the same period 
will result in a higher percentage of successful BEE transactions as the 
reduction of third party finance minimises exposure of BEE companies to the 
market. This is however not the case. The drop in the number of successful 
transactions could have been worse in the 2008-2012 period due to the 
financial crisis. However, the decline of third party finance and increase of 
vendor finance minimized the impact of the financial crisis.   
Although the above analysis highlights important trends in the use of funding 
methods and the percentage of successful transactions, it doesn’t adequately 
address the relationship between the success of transactions and funding 
methods used. As a result an alternative approach, which looks at the 
influence of funding sources within hybrid funding structures on the success 
of such hybrid structures, was considered.  
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4.4. IMPACT OF VARIOUS SOURCES OF FUNDING ON THE 
SUCCESS OF FUNDING STRUCTURES  
47% of transactions analysed were funded using structured finance, 
indicating that this form of funding was used extensively in mining BEE deals. 
For this reason, it became necessary to analyse the impact of various 
mechanisms of funding on the success of funding structures and their 
resultant impact on the success of BEE transactions. Also, this analysis would 
highlight trends that are not obvious in section 4.3.2 analysis as it isolates 
individual funding mechanisms and evaluates their success rates at different 
percentages within hybrid funding structures.  
Two scenarios were investigated. First, the analysis was done on the total 
data set, including transactions that had not used structured funding. Second, 
the analysis was done on data consisting of transactions that were funded 
using structured finance only to amplify trends of individual mechanisms.  
Figure 4.4.1 shows the results of the first scenario, which does not depict a 
clear picture as the trends are weakened by the inclusion of transactions that 
did not make use of structured finance. Figure 4.4.2 shows the results of the 
second scenario. 
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Figure 4.4.1: How proportions of various sources of funding in a structure 
impacts the success of a funding structure 
 
Figure 4.4.2: Impact of the percentage of source or mechanism of funding in 
a funding structure on the success of a transaction 
The following trends can be observed: 
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4.4.1. Equity 
The success rate increases as the proportion of equity in the funding 
structures increases, indicating that BEE deals that had high proportion of 
equity in their funding structures were in comparison more successful that the 
ones that had low proportion of equity. This observation is consistent with 
conclusions drawn by other researchers. Important to note is that at 40% the 
success rate of equity finance reaches 100%. That is, all transactions that 
used more than 40% of the BEE shareholders money were successful. This 
can be attributed to the increased commitment on the BEE shareholders part 
as their investment amount in transactions increased. Also, self-funding 
lowers interest payments that must be made to financiers, thus increasing 
liquidity that flows directly to the BEE enterprise.  
The equity graph plots at a higher success rate than other sources and 
mechanisms of funding. Therefore, equity finance has a more positive impact 
than other sources of funding on a transaction even when the proportion of 
equity finance and other funding methods are equal within the funding 
structure. The equity graph stops at 50% proportion as there were no 
‘structured finance’ transactions that consisted of more than 58% of equity in 
their funding structure.  
There were two transactions that consisted of 100% equity. In the first 
transaction, Royal Bafokeng Nation acquired 13.4% of Impala platinum. In the 
second transaction, Waterberg Portion Property Investments acquired 31.4% 
of Wescoal. Both transactions were considered sustainable. The two 
transactions are indicated on figure 4.4.3, which shows all the transactions 
that contained equity finance in their funding structures. The percentage of 
equity in those transactions and an indication of whether they were 
sustainable are shown. 
66 
 
 
Figure 4.4.3: Transactions that contained equity finance 
4.4.2. Third Party Finance 
From 0 to 40% in the funding structure the success rate of third party finance 
increases slightly. Thereafter the success rate drops rapidly at third party 
funding of more than 40%. This form of funding consists mostly of debt; 
therefore, high levels of gearing increases the cost of funding, thus reducing 
liquidity and making transactions vulnerable to changes in market conditions. 
That could in turn make the BEE transactions unsustainable. Also, debt 
extended to BEE entrepreneurs was relatively expensive, further contributing 
to the unsustainability of BEE deals. Third party funding was also used in the 
early days of BEE with SPV models which, as highlighted in the literature 
review chapter, relied on the bull market and share price appreciation to 
succeed.    
4.4.3. Vendor Finance 
The success rate of vendor finance is unexpectedly lower than that of third 
party finance from a proportion of 30 to 60% in the funding structure. This 
indicates that transactions that had less than 60% vendor finance were not 
necessarily more successful that those that had the same level of third party 
finance in their structures. Only after 60% does vendor finance’s success rate 
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increase rapidly. Therefore, vendor finance made a material difference to the 
success of BEE transactions where such vendor finance was a lot higher than 
third party funding. Failure of vendor finance to impact transactions positively 
at levels lower than 60% indicates that the influence of vendor finance was 
diluted by high levels of debt funding in transactions where debt funding was 
a lot higher than other sources of funding. This trend could also explain why a 
large increase in the use of vendor finance did not result in a correspondingly 
higher number of successful transactions in the 2004 – 2007 and 2008 to 
2012 eras (see section 4.3.2). Engelbrecht (2007), in his empowerment 
continuum model, indicated that vendor financed transactions were 
sustainable at a significantly higher and costly levels of funding to the vendors 
(Figure 2.7). The above finding supports that observation. See chapter 2.5.1.  
4.4.4. Preference Share Instruments 
The success rate of preference share instruments is significantly lower than 
that of other sources of funding; 33% at most within transactions that used 
hybrid funding structures. This funding mechanism is associated with SPVs 
which contributed to the demise of many BEE transactions. This finding thus 
confirms results concluded by other researchers regarding the performance of 
preference share instruments in SPVs. Figure 4.4.4 below shows transactions 
that consisted of preference share instruments. 
Two transactions were financed through 100% share instruments. In one 
transaction Wesizwe Platinum, in which Bakubung-ba-Ratheo community 
bought 33% shareholding in 2004, acquired Anglo Platinum Limited’s entire 
37% stake in the Western Bushveld Joint Venture (WBJV) at a cost of R1.1 
billion in 2008.  
The second transaction consists of the acquisition of 0.5% stake in AngloGold 
Ashanti by Izingwe Holdings at a cost of R350 thousand. The transaction was 
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considered successful as Izingwe Holdings sold the shares in 2012 for a 
value of R14 million. 
 
Figure 4.4.4: Transactions that contained preference share finance 
Based on the above analysis, an ideal BEE transaction that is funded using 
structured finance would consist of the following funding ratios: 
1. Third party: Vendor : Equity = 40: 20: 40 – Below 40% of third party 
finance the success rate of third party finance is similar to that of 
vendor finance. Also, below 40%, third party finance does not show a 
negative influence on the success of transactions. At 40% equity the 
success rate of transactions is 100%. In this scenario the success of a 
transaction is driven primarily by high level of self-funding. An example 
of this composition is the transaction between De Beers and Petra 
Diamonds Cullinan Consortium (“PDCC”) in which the consortium 
acquired Cullinan Mine and Centenary-Cut (C-Cut) project. The 
transaction had 54% third party finance and 46% equity finance. There 
was no vendor finance in the transaction but self-funding was high 
enough to offset the negative impact of third party funding, hence the 
sustainability of the transaction.  
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2. Third party: Vendor = <40%  : > 60% – In this scenario high level of 
vendor finance protects the BEE company against market risk. The 
AngloAmerican Coal_Inyosi Consortium transaction is a case in point. 
AngloAmerica Coal provided vendor finance amounting to R6.9 billion 
to finance Inyosi Consortium’s 27% ownership in Kriel Colliery and the 
four projects – Elders, Zondagsfontein, New Largo and Heidelberg.  
 
Another example is Sasol_Ixia Coal transaction in which Ixia Coal 
acquired 20% in Sasol’s mining subsidiary. The transaction was 
financed using 58% vendor finance and 40% third party finance. These 
transactions were considered sustainable.  
Overall, the impact of funding methods as discussed above is consistent with 
reviewed literature.  
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4.5. USE OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS TO ESTABLISH 
CORRELATION BETWEEN SOURCES OR MECHANISMS OF 
FUNDING AND THE SUCCESS OF TRANSACTIONS 
Is there a meaningful correlation between various sources or mechanisms of 
funding and the sustainability or success of BEE transactions as discussed 
above? This section of the analysis answers the aforementioned question by 
testing the existence of possible correlation and further examining if the 
various correlations are statistically significant. Regression analysis will be 
used for this purpose.  
Although regression analysis can be used for the purpose of developing 
forecasting models; in this study it will be used solely for the purpose of 
examining the existence of relationships and testing their statistical 
significance. Specifically, to what extent do sources and mechanisms of 
funding explain the successes or failures of BEE transactions, hence their 
sustainability? Therefore, the results of this regression analysis cannot be 
used to predict the success of a transaction based on the value (monetary) or 
percentage of a particular source or mechanism of funding in a transaction.  
The analysis was carried out as follows: 
The data was grouped into calendar years in which the transactions occurred; 
that is, all transactions that happened in the same calendar year were 
grouped together. A period of a year was considered representative based on 
the size of the sample population. Amounts of the respective sources or 
mechanisms of funding were added for all transactions falling within the same 
year. The percentage of successful transactions was also calculated for each 
group/calendar year using the ratio of successful transactions to the total 
number of transactions. 
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Before the analysis was done the data was cleaned by removing every year 
that had zero and one transaction. This means that data from 1995 to 2000 
and 2011 to 2012 was removed. The calculated data is tabulated in table 
4.5.1.  
Year 
Vendor 
Finance 
Third 
Party 
Equity 
Preference 
Share 
Total 
Value  
No. 
Transactions 
Successful 
Transactions 
% of 
Successful 
Transactions 
1995 0 326 0 0 326 1 1 100% 
1998 66 0 0 0 66 1 1 100% 
2000 0 459 0 0 459 1 1 100% 
2002 0 264 0 0 264 3 3 100% 
2003 34 1,695 15 234 1,978 3 1 33% 
2004 3,068 5,289 76 1,552 9,985 5 2 40% 
2005 89 333 38 0 460 4 4 100% 
2006 5,175 6,498 2,023 15 13,711 10 7 70% 
2007 6,968 0 12,161 2,500 21,629 4 4 100% 
2008 617 1,728 545 1,162 4,051 6 3 50% 
2009 5,033 300 15 2,300 7,648 5 4 80% 
2010 4,459 738 347 0 5,544 4 4 100% 
2011 371 0 0 0 371 1 1 100% 
2012 20 0 0 0 20 1 1 100% 
 
*Removed Data #Used Data 
Tab le  4 .5 .1 :  Da ta  a r rangemen t  f o r  regress ion  ana lys is  
The tabulated results were then used to draw scatter plots from which the 
regression analysis and hypothesis testing were carried out using Microsoft 
Excel data analysis tools.  
A linear relationship, between rand value or percentages of sources and 
mechanisms of funding used in transactions and the percentage of successful 
BEE transactions within a year, was assumed.  
Amounts or percentages of sources and mechanisms of funding in 
transactions were defined as independent variables (X) and the percentage of 
successful transactions was classified as a dependent variable (Y). There 
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was no sufficient data to determine the statistical distribution that the % of 
successful transactions and the percentage of a funding method in a 
transaction follow. In order to carry out the analysis, a normal distribution was 
assumed. The validity of this assumption can only be tested if there is 
sufficient data to model the respective statistical distributions.   
The results of the analysis for various methods of funding are discussed 
below. 
4.5.1. Vendor Finance  
There is a positive correlation between the value of vendor finance in 
transactions and their percentage of success. This indicates that BEE 
transactions were more successful in years that had higher values of vendor 
finance. The R2 value (square of the correlation between the dependent and 
independent variables) is higher in the regression model that was developed 
using percentage of vendor finance in a transactions rather than the value of 
transactions (see figure 4.5.2). 
 
Figure 4.5.1: Regression analysis of vendor finance value in transactions vs 
the success of such transactions 
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The results on both regression plots are consistent with the results 
highlighted under the analysis of funding structures.  
The R2 value of 31.6% (in figure 4.5.2) is comparatively low, indicating that 
the use of vendor finance in transactions can only explain approximately 32% 
of their successes or failures. This was expected as the success of a BEE 
transaction depends not only on the source or mechanism of funding used, 
but also on many other factors that are not the scope of this research. E.g. 
failure of BEE transactions that were concluded by JCI in 2004 – with 
OrlyFunt – happened more as a result of fraudulent trading of shares rather 
than the funding models that were used to fund the transactions.  
Some BEE transactions failed as a result of lack of cooperation and 
commitment among members of BEE consortiums or groups. The transaction 
that was concluded by Wesizwe Platinum and Bakubung-ba-Ratheo 
community is a typical example. Bakubung-ba-Ratheo community acquired 
33% shareholding in Wesizwe Platinum in 2004. In 2007 Bakubung-ba-
Ratheo sold a portion of shareholding in Wesizwe Platinum in order to buy 
shares in other companies to diversify the organisation’s investment. Value 
was destroyed in the process of reinvesting the earnings from the sale of 
shares due to disagreements amongst community members. This resulted in 
a drop from 33% to 9% shareholding in Wesizwe and no significant 
shareholding by the group elsewhere. The challenge faced by Wesizwe 
Platinum is that it may not be considered fully compliant with the Mining 
Charter depending on the application of once empowered always empowered 
principle.  
Increasing the size of the data set used in the analysis may improve the R2 
value of 31.6%, but it’s not expected to improve by a significant number as 
other factors play a role in determining the success or failure of transactions. 
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Figure 4.5.2: Regression analysis of the percentage of vendor finance in 
transactions vs the success of such transactions 
4.5.2. Third Party Finance 
Figure 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 indicate results of the third party finance value and 
percentage in transactions plotted against the % of successful transactions. 
Both scatter plots show a negative correlation between the value and 
percentage of third party finance and the success of transactions. This 
confirms that the amount of third party finance in transactions does influence 
them; the higher the value of third party funding the lower the sustainability of 
a transaction. This relationship is more prominent at third party funding of 
greater 40% in a transaction as shown in figure 4.4.2.  
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Figure 4.5.3: Regression analysis of third party finance value in transactions 
vs the success of such transactions 
The R2 values of both plots are low, 17% and 1.2% for the third party value 
and percentage plots respectively. This also indicates that this funding 
method explains a small percentage of the success or failure of BEE 
transactions; 17% at most.  
 
Figure 4.5.4: Regression analysis of third party finance percentage in 
transactions vs the success of such transactions 
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4.5.3. Equity Finance  
Figure 4.5.5 and 4.5.6 below indicate an increase in the success of BEE 
transactions as the value and percentage of equity in BEE transactions 
increase. This observation is consistent with expectations and is aligned with 
the conclusions drawn by other researchers. Both R2 values are relatively 
low, 17% and 21% for the value and percentage plots respectively. Thus 
equity finance also explains, at most, 21% of the success or failure of BEE 
transactions.  
 
Figure 4.5.5: Regression analysis of equity finance value in transactions vs 
the success of such transactions 
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Figure 4.5.6: Regression analysis of equity finance percentage in transactions 
& the success of such transactions 
4.5.4. Preference Share Instruments  
Unlike the 3 methods of funding discussed above, preference share 
instruments are not sources of funding, but mechanisms and have often been 
used with third party funding in SPV structures. The two plots, preference 
share value and percentage plots, show different correlations. The value plot 
shows a positive correlation while the percentage plot shows a negative 
correlation. See figure 4.5.7 and 4.5.8. 
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Figure 4.5.7: Regression analysis of preference share finance value in 
transactions & the success of such transactions 
 
Figure 4.5.8: Regression analysis of preference share finance percentage in 
transactions vs the success of such transactions 
As preference shares instruments were used with third party funding in SPV 
structures one would expect a negative correlation between the percentage of these 
instruments in funding structures of transactions and the success of such 
transactions.  Thus, figure 4.5.8 could be considered to be more representative of 
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the relationship, more so because it looks at the percentages of applicable values in 
a transaction.  
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4.6. TESTING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ESTABLISHED 
RELATIONSHIPS USING HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Relationships established above may be real or they may be occurring by 
chance. Hypothesis testing was used to test whether the relationships 
discussed above are coincidental, and if not, how statistically significant are 
they. Details of the hypothesis testing are outlined below.  
4.6.1. Details of the Hypothesis Testing: Assumptions and Inputs 
The null hypothesis (H0): There is no correlation between the various 
sources and mechanisms of funding and the success or sustainability of BEE 
transactions being funded using such sources or mechanisms. Thus, in a 
linear relationship represented by: 
Y = B0 + B1X, were Y is the success rate (%) of transactions, B0 is a constant 
and B1 is a slope or regression coefficient and X is the percentage of a source 
or mechanism of funding in a transaction, the null hypothesis can be 
represented as H0: B1 = 0. 
The alternative hypothesis (Ha): There is correlation between the various 
sources and mechanisms of funding and the success of BEE transactions 
being funded using such sources or mechanisms. Ha: B1 ≠ 0. 
Level of significance (α): The level of significance is normally set at 5% in 
hypothesis testing, however a grey area of 15-20% could also be 
acknowledged.  At a 20% critical value, there would be reason enough to 
doubt the validity of the null hypothesis; however the null hypothesis would, if 
results suggest that it should be rejected, not be rejected altogether due to 
lack of sufficient evidence (Explorable, 2015). The significance level in this 
test will be set at a 20% level due to the sample size used and the unique 
objectives of performing this analysis. Additional reasons for the use of 20% 
significance level are: 
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 The models being tested would be used solely for the purpose of 
examining the existence of correlation between the sources and 
mechanisms of funding and the success of transactions 
 Regression models emanating from the analysis would not be used for 
any forecasting or prediction purposes  
 Although the sample size used is adequate, it is not high enough to 
suite the use of a lower level of significance  
 Consequences associated with the use of a high critical value are 
tolerable  
At this significance level, the researcher is willing to accept a 20% probability 
that the null hypothesis could be rejected when it should have been accepted 
(type I error would occur). This corresponds with the 80% confidence level 
specified when the correct sample size for the research was calculated (see 
chapter 3.2.1). 
Test statistic: The linear regression t-test will be applied to the data. The 
following information was required to perform the test for each funding 
method: 
 Standard error of the slope 
 The slope of the regression line  
 The t-score test statistic 
 The P value of the test statistic: The P value was used in conjunction 
with the significance level or critical value. If the P-Value was less than 
the significance level of 20%, the null hypothesis was rejected; if the P-
Value was higher than the specified significance level the null 
hypothesis was accepted. 
The above mentioned parameters were calculated for all funding sources and 
mechanisms. The results are summarised in table 4.6.1 below. 
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Source/Mechanism 
Standard 
Error of 
Slope 
Slope of 
Regression 
t-score 
test 
statistic 
P 
Value 
Significance 
Level 
Accept 
/Reject 
H0 
Vendor Finance 0.36 0.6 1.67 0.15 20%/0.2 Reject 
Third Party Finance 0.34 -0.1 -0.27 0.79 20%/0.2 Accept 
Equity 0.55 0.7 1.26 0.25 20%/0.2 Accept 
Preference Shares 1.15 -0.4 -0.30 0.78 20%/0.2 Accept 
Tab le  4 .6 .1 :  Summary  o f  hypo thes is  tes t ing pa rame te rs  fo r  
va r ious  fund ing methods  
The calculated parameters were used to conclude the hypothesis testing as 
discussed below.  
4.6.2. Discussion of Hypothesis Testing  
4.6.2.1. Vendor Finance 
The P value was calculated to be 0.15. Thus at 95% confidence level the null 
hypothesis, which states that there is no correlation between vendor finance 
and the success of BEE transactions, can be accepted. However, at 80% 
confidence level, the null hypothesis can be rejected, implying that there is a 
relationship between the percentage of vendor finance used in BEE 
transactions and their success. As mentioned above, the objective of this 
analysis is not to develop a prediction or forecasting model, but to merely test 
the existence of a correlation. 80% confidence level is considered adequate 
for this purpose. Although the null hypothesis is rejected, at this level of 
confidence it cannot be totally rejected due to a lack of sufficient evidence.  
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4.6.2.2. Third Party Finance  
The P value of 79% suggests that the correlation indicated on figure 4.5.4 is 
mostly coincidental. The Null hypothesis can only be rejected at 21% 
confidence level. This confidence level is significantly low, even for the 
purpose of this research. It can thus be concluded that the relationship 
between the percentage of third party finance in transactions and the success 
of such transactions is statistically insignificant.  
4.6.2.3. Equity Finance  
P value of 25% shows that the correlation between the success of BEE 
transactions and Equity finance can be said to exist with 75% confidence 
level. At 80% confidence level the null hypothesis is accepted. Based on the 
available information, the relationship indicated in figure 4.5.6 occurs by 
chance. 
4.6.2.4. Preference Shares  
The P value of 78% indicates that a relationship between the percentage of 
preference share instruments in transactions and the success of such 
transactions can be said to exist with 22% confidence level, which is low even 
for the purpose of this research. This low level of confidence is similar to the 
one calculated for third party finance (21%). The null hypothesis is accepted.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. DISCUSSIONS  
The Native Land Act 27 of 1913 resulted in the automatic exclusion of 
Historically Disadvantaged South Africans from ownership of minerals or 
mining rights and thus denied them access to entrepreneurship opportunities 
within the mining sector. Numerous changes to South Africa’s mineral policies 
between 1913 and 1992 failed to address this unfair exclusion of HDSAs from 
sharing in the country’s mineral wealth, especially in the area of meaningful 
economic participation.   
This changed when the democratic dispensation was introduced.  In the early 
1990s the ANC began the process of restructuring the country, including 
effecting changes in mineral policies. Achieved changes were informed by the 
freedom charter, which states that “the mineral wealth beneath the soil shall 
be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole”. The process of 
reforming mineral policies culminated in the promulgation of the Minerals and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act, Act No. 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) and 
the Mining Charter in 2002 and 2004 respectively. These documents paved a 
way for HDSAs to participate in ownership of mining businesses. In particular, 
the Mining Charter compelled parent mining companies to transfer 26% of 
ownership to HDSAs by 2014. 
BEE activities increased as a result of the formalisation of mining BEE laws 
(Mining Charter). However, some concluded BEE transactions were 
unsustainable leading to the 2009 impact assessment by the DMR. Over the 
various BEE eras, stakeholders speculated on issues that caused 
transactions to fail. Funding models of BEE transactions were singled out as 
one of the major contributors. Various researchers conducted research to 
study funding models, though such research was predominantly qualitative. 
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In terms of the literature review conducted, vendor financing has been the 
preferred method of funding BEE transactions in mining. The use of vendor 
financing increased post 2007, after the amendment of the Companies Act 
No. 61 OF 1973 and subsequent promulgation of the New Companies Act 
No. 71 OF 2008. Vendor finance was underlined by most researchers as the 
sustainable funding model, even though it is costly to parent mining 
companies.  
Prior to the amendment of the Companies Act, third party funding was the 
predominant funding model. A combination of third party debt and complex 
SPV funding structures led to the demise of many BEE transactions. SPVs 
require a bull market and share price appreciation to succeed, whereas third 
party funding in general failed as a result of unsustainable interest rates. 
Their weaknesses were exposed by the Asian crisis of 1998 and the 2008 
global financial crisis. Such weaknesses prompted changes to the 
Companies Act as discussed above.  
This research sought to establish funding models that have been sustainable 
since the inception of BEE to 2014. Furthermore, the research aimed at 
highlighting models that would remain sustainable going forward, particularly 
in the absence of regulatory pressure. These objectives were fulfilled by 
quantitatively analysing the frequency of use of various funding sources and 
mechanisms, quantifying the impact of regulatory and economic changes on 
the use and success of BEE funding models, establishing the existence of 
correlation between sources and mechanisms of funding and the success of 
BEE transactions, testing for statistical significance in the relationships 
established and elaborating on the impact of established results on the 
sustainability of BEE transactions. 
The research confirmed that vendor finance was the most preferred method 
of funding BEE transactions, followed by third party funding. From 1992 – 
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2012 vendor finance and third party finance were used 36% and 29% of the 
time respectively. Equity funding was used 25% of the time, while preference 
share instruments had a frequency of use of 10%.  
The promulgation of the Mining Charter in 2004 resulted in a sharp increase 
in the number of BEE transactions concluded. The number of transactions 
concluded, particularly between 2004 and 2007, was further boosted by a 
favourable economic climate that was experienced from the early 2000s. The 
adaptation of the Companies Act to BEE funding requirements enabled 
parent mining companies to provide vendor finance and facilitation to BEE 
enterprises. As such, third party funding decreased from 89% of BEE deals’ 
funding by value prior to 2004 to 27% in the 2004 – 2007 period. During the 
same period, vendor finance increased from 3.2% to 33.4% of the total value 
of BEE funding. It increased further from 33.4% to 59.5% in the period of 
2008 – 2012. Equity funding increased from 0.5% to 31% from the first to the 
second BEE era.  
Contrary to expectations, the sharp increase in the proportion of both vendor 
and equity finance in BEE transactions funding did not result in a 
correspondingly sharp increase in the sustainability of BEE transactions. The 
percentage of successful BEE transactions increased marginally from 70% 
prior to 2004 to 78% in the 2004 – 2007 period. There was a slight drop to 
76.5% from the 2004 – 2007 to the 2008 – 2012 era, while the proportion of 
vendor and equity finance increased in the same period. A large proportion of 
third party finance in individual transactions, specifically at proportions of 
greater than 40%, still resulted in failure of transactions although the value of 
vendor and equity finance had increased. Based on the above discussion, it 
can thus be concluded that: 
 The promulgation of the mining charter resulted in a steep increase in 
the number of BEE transactions concluded, but it did not necessarily 
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translate into a significant improvement in the percentage of successful 
transactions. 
 The amendment and subsequent promulgation of the new companies 
act caused the proportion of vendor finance in transactions funding to 
grow significantly; however, this did not result in a correspondingly 
higher number of successful BEE transactions 
 Overall, changes in the regulatory environment caused a spike in the 
number of BEE transactions and vendor finance and facilitation, but it 
did not directly influence the sustainability of BEE transactions to a 
greater extend.  
The impact of funding methods on the success of BEE transactions is more 
prominent in transactions that were financed using structured finance. Within 
those transactions, the success rate of BEE deals increases with increasing 
contribution of equity and vendor finance. The impact of equity finance is 
significant from proportions as low as 20% in the funding structure. This may 
be caused by higher commitment levels on the part of BEE investors once 
they have committed equity to the transactions. Vendor finance on the other 
hand resulted in improvement in the success rate of transactions from a 
proportion of 60% in the transactions. This finding is consistent with the 
results shown by Engelbrecht (2007), who indicated that sustainable 
transactions have come at a higher cost to parent mining companies.  
The success rate of transactions decreases with increasing proportion of third 
party finance and the use of preference share instruments. Both of them were 
used in conjunction with SPVs that resulted in the failure of BEE transactions 
in the early days of BEE.  
Based on the analysis conducted, an ideal structured financed transaction 
would have the following proportions of the various funding methods: 
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 Third party: Vendor: Equity = 40: 20: 40. In this funding structure 
third party finance is chosen at 40%, which is at a level that still shows 
a positive influence on the success rate of transactions. Beyond 40%, 
third party finance impacts the success rate of transactions negatively. 
This ideal level of third party finance would optimise return on equity 
invested while keeping third party finance at a level that does not make 
the transaction vulnerable. Equity finance of 40% would be ideal as, at 
40% equity finance has a success rate of 100%. The high level of 
equity finance in the funding structure enhances the sustainability of 
the transaction. Vendor finance is kept minimal, at 20%, as it does not 
have a significant influence on the success rate of transactions when it 
is less than 60% in the funding structure.  
 
Figure 5.1: Proposed funding structure (a) 
Where no equity is available the ideal funding structure would be: 
 Third party: Vendor = <40%: > 60%. In this funding structure third 
party finance must be kept below 40%, which is at a level that still 
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shows a positive influence on the success rate of transactions. Vendor 
finance should ideally exceed 60%, which is the level at which it has a 
positive impact on the success rate of transactions. 
 
Figure 5.1: Proposed funding structure (b) 
It was shown through regression analysis that some correlation exists 
between the funding method(s) used and the success of BEE transactions. In 
terms of the established relationships, funding methods can explain, at most, 
32% of the successes or failures of BEE transactions. This means that other 
external factors, which are not the scope of this research, also explain a 
significant part of the successes or failures of transactions. E.g. failure of BEE 
transactions that were concluded by JCI in 2004 – with OrlyFunt – happened 
more as a result of fraudulent trading of shares rather than the funding 
models that were used to fund the transactions. Some BEE transactions 
failed as a result of lack of cooperation and commitment among members of 
BEE consortiums or groups. 
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Of the correlations established between funding methods and the success of 
transactions, only the relationship of vendor finance can be said to be 
statistically significant at a critical value of 20%. Equity finance can be 
considered reasonably significant at a confidence level of 75%. In the case of 
third party funding and preference share instruments, the relationships can be 
considered to be coincidental.   
Both vendor finance and equity finance show a positive correlation with the 
success of BEE transactions. As their percentage increase in the funding 
structure so does the sustainability of a transactions. Although third party and 
preference share funding show a negative correlation, it would be incorrect to 
suggest that transactions would fail if they are used as their relationships 
were found to be statistically insignificant. Table 5.1 summarises the research 
findings. 
 
Tab le  5 .1 :  Summary  o f  resea rch  f ind ings   
It can thus be concluded that vendor finance will continue to be a sustainable 
funding method going forward. The concern though is that its application was 
Frequency of 
(1994-2012)
Impact of 
change in 
legislation 
Impact on 
success rate of 
transactions
Correlation 
with success 
of BEE 
transactions
Statistical 
significance of 
correlation 
Sustainability Remarks
Vendor 36% Positive 
Positive > 60% 
in funding 
structure
Positive Significant 
Sustainable, 
More defined 
> 60% in 
transaction  
Vendor finance is sustainable, but 
costly to vendors. Its frequency of use 
will decrease in a relaxed regulatory 
environment.
Third Party 29% Negative 
Negative > 
40% in funding 
structure
Negative Coincidental
Sustainable < 
40% in 
transaction
Third party finance is sustainable, 
provided that it is kept minimal in the 
transaction structure & interest rates 
are low. Its frequency of use will 
increase if vendor finance dries up.
Equity (Self-
funding)
25% Positive  Positive  Positive 
Significant at 
75% confidene 
level. 
Coincidetal > 
75% 
confidence 
level
Sustainable 
Self-funding is sustainable as it 
encourages BEE investors to be more 
involved in the aquired business. It 
increases earnings that flow to BEE 
investors by minimising interest 
payments. The risk of default is 
minimized. 
Preference 
Share 
Instruments 
10% Positive Inconclusive Inconclusive Coincidental Inconclusive 
There was no sufficient data to obtain 
conclusive results. 
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brought about by regulatory intervention. In the absence of this regulatory 
pressure, mining companies may be reluctant to extend vendor funding to 
HDSAs as the provision of vendor finance would not be linked to mitigation of 
parent companies’ business risk (non-renewal of mining licenses or not being 
granted a license at all). This will impact the sustainability of transactions 
negatively. It is crucial that HDSA entrepreneurs grow their capital pool as 
equity funding will make transactions sustainable even in difficult economic 
climates. The use of third party funding must ideally be kept below 40% in 
transaction structures.    
It is also evident that the sample size used in the analysis (50 transactions) 
doesn’t provide adequate information to draw conclusions with a high level of 
confidence. 50 transactions only give 85% confidence level. This was 
highlighted in chapter 3, and mention was made that the parameters chosen 
in the calculation of the sample size mean that one would be 80% sure that 
the results of the analysis are correct ± 10% (confidence interval). While this 
is adequate for this research, further benefit could be derived from a study 
conducted using a larger sample size. 
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5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Based on the research conducted and while BEE laws are in place, the 
recommended funding models are: 
 Third party: Vendor: Equity = 40%: 20%: 40%, in the case of a BEE 
company that has equity available and  
 Third party: Vendor = <40%: > 60%, where no equity is available to 
BEE entrepreneurs 
In the absence of BEE laws prior to 2004, third party finance was the 
dominant method of financing BEE transactions (see chapter 4.2 and 4.3); 
therefore, it can be expected that third party finance will again dominate the 
funding of transactions in a relaxed regulatory environment. Thus in the 
absence of BEE laws third party finance must be provided at loan terms that 
are less onerous to HDSA investors. This can be achieved by: 
 Ensuring that government funding institutions have greater capacity to 
provide affordable funding to a broader pool of entrepreneurs.   
 Extending a favourable tax regime to new BEE companies within the 
first few years of their establishment to boost their cash flow and ability 
to service debt. 
 Creating an environment that encourages parent mining companies to 
provide vendor facilitation in a form of guarantees as this will moderate 
risk and result in the provision of funding with favourable terms to 
HDSA investors.  
 Structuring third party funded BEE deals in ways that rely less on 
dividend payment and more on cash flow generated by assets to 
service debt.  
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Unavailability of information has been a notable disadvantage in this 
research. This has resulted in the study being concluded at a confidence level 
of 80%. Also, the trends observed in the research could be clearer with the 
availability and use of a larger sample size. A sample size of 184 transactions 
will result in a confidence level of 95% at a 5% margin of error.  
The nonexistence of statistical significance in the correlation of the 
percentage of successful transactions and the use of third party and 
preference share instruments could be partially attributed to lack of 
information. It is the opinion of the author of this report that a sample size 
suggested above would show statistically significant correlations for third 
party finance and preference share instruments. Thus a similar quantitative 
study could be conducted using a larger sample. In order for the sample size 
to be increased the DMR, individual mining enterprises and the COM must 
assist the researchers with information.  
i 
 
REFERENCES  
 
1) Barnes M, 2013. Time to redesign black economic empowerment. 
BusinessDay Live, [online] 7 October 2013. Available at: 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2013/10/07/time-to-
redesign-black-economic-empowerment. Accessed April 2014.  
2) Black Economic Empowerment Commission, 2001. Black Economic 
Empowerment Commission Report (BEE). [PDF]. Skotaville Press 
2001, 17 Spartan Crescent, Eastgate Ext 3, Woodmead, 
Johannesburg 2001. Available at : 
https://www.westerncape.gov.za/text/2004/5/beecomreport.pdf 
3) Bluechip Journal, 2012. Flexibility in structuring transactions, the new 
companies act eases BEE structuring, [Online] 7 September 2012. 
Available at: http://www.bluechipjournal.co.za/articles/companies-
act.10-1819.html. Accessed June 2014.  
4) Borghgraef. T, 2014. Acquisition motives and methods of financing. 
MSc. Ghent University.  
5) Bowman Gilfillan, n.d. Black Economic Empowerment guide. [PDF]. 
Available at: 
http://services.bowman.co.za/Brochures/BEE/BEEBrochure-lr.pdf. 
[Accessed June 2014]. 
6)  Bravura, 2010. Charter review can help address BEE quandary, p17. 
Business Day. [PDF, 27 July 2010]. Available at: 
www.miningforchange.co.za. Accessed 5 January 2013. 
7) Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, Act 53 of 2003. 
Republic of South Africa. 
ii 
 
8) Brown. C.M, 2011. How to finance an acquisition. INC, [Online] 20 Jan 
2011. Available at: http://www.inc.com/guides/201101/business-
acquisition-financing.html.  
9)  Cawood F.T. and Minnitt R.C.A., 1998. A historical perspective on the 
economics of the ownership of mineral rights ownership. The Journal 
of The South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, v098n07, 
p369.  
10) CBIZ, 2008. Acquisition Financing and Payment Structures. [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.cbiz-
onesource.com/valuationgroup/page.asp?pid=1502. Accessed April 
2015.  
11) COM, 2011. Presentation to the portfolio committee on mineral 
resources, slide 11. Available at: 
www.bullion.org.za/documents/Parliament-presentation-2011.ppt. 
Accessed on 05 Oct 2013. 
12) Congress of the People, 1955. The Freedom Charter. [On line]. 
Available at: https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/anc/1955/freedom-
charter.htm. [Accessed 29 March 2015].  
13) Cooper. G, 1998. Seller Financing Basics, [online]. Available at: 
http://www.bizbuysell.com/seller_resources/seller-financing-basics/17/. 
Accessed April 2015.   
14) Correia et al, 2011. Financial Management. 7th Edition. Lansdowne, 
Cape Town, South Africa: Juta and Company Ltd. 
15) Daniels S.L, 2010. The impact of economic downturn on black 
economic empowerment and banks. MSc, Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University. [PDF]. Available at: 
iii 
 
http://dspace.nmmu.ac.za:8080/jspui/bitstream/10948/1505/1/Thesis%
20final%20document.pdf. Accessed February 2014.  
16) Department of Mineral Resources (DMR), 2009. Mining Charter 
Impact Assessment Report. [PDF]. Available at: www.info.gov.za. 
Accessed on 08 Oct 2013. 
17) DMR, 2010. Amendment Of The Broad-Based Socio-Economic 
Empowerment Charter For The South African Mining And Minerals 
Industry. [PDF] South Africa: Department of Mineral Resource. 
Available at: 
http://www.bullion.org.za/MediaReleases/Downloads/Amended_of_BB
SEE_Charter.pdf. Accessed on 13 July 2013.  
18) Empowerdex, 2009. A summary of the bee transactions in the mining 
sector 2004-2008, p4. [PDF]. Available at: 
http://www.empowerdex.co.za/RESEARCH/ResearchArchive/tabid/192
/Default.aspx. Accessed October 2013.  
19) Engelbrecht, 2007. Mechanisms for Financing BEE Transactions. 
MineAfrica’s BEE seminar. 249 Queen's Quay West, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada M5J 2N5 November 2007. Available at: 
http://www.mineafrica.com/documents/4%20-
%20Standard%20Bank.pdf  
20) Ernst & Young, 2010. BEE Deals, [online] 03 May 2010. Available at: 
http://solidariteitinstituut.co.za/rabib/index.php?title=BEE_deals. 
Accessed January 2015.  
21) Ernst & Young, 2012. Mergers, acquisitions and capital raising in 
mining and metals, [PDF]. Available at: http://www.ey.com/Publication. 
Accessed April 2015.  
iv 
 
22) Explorable, 2015. Statistical Hypothesis Testing. [Online]. Available at: 
https://explorable.com/statistical-hypothesis-testing. [Accessed 2015]. 
23) Financial Times, 2014. Market Data. Available at:  
http://markets.ft.com/research/Markets/Tearsheets/Summary?s=59716
2. [Accessed 2014]. 
24) Firer et al, 2012. Fundamentals of corporate finance. 5th South African 
Edition. Shoppenhangers Road, Maidenhead, Berkshire, UK. McGraw-
Hill Education.  
25) Fox N, Hunn A and Mathers N, 2009.  Sampling and Sample Size 
Calculation. National institute for health research. [PDF]. Available at: 
http://www.rds-eastmidlands.nihr.ac.uk/. Accessed January 2015. 
26) Gevers M. and Boynton P, n.d. Mezzanine Debt Fund. Old Mutual 
Investment  Group. [PDF]. 
27) Gitman L.J, 2000. Principles of Managerial Finance. Ninth Edition. 
Menlo Park, California. 
28) Godden B, 2004. Sample size formula. [PDF]. Available at: 
http://www.williamgodden.com/samplesizeformula.pdf. Accessed 
January 2015 
29) Handelsman. M, 2012. 5 Steps to a Successful Seller Financing Deal. 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.inc.com/mike-handelsman/5-steps-to-
a-successful-seller-financing-deal.html. Accessed May 2015.  
30) Jacks M, 2010. Motlanthe warns council BEE has failed. Business 
Report- Pretoria News Page Number: 1 [Online], 05 February 2010. 
Available at: http://146.232.97.233/Media/NewsClippings. Accessed 
April 2014.  
v 
 
31) JSE, 2014. Equity Markets.[Online]. Available at: 
https://www.jse.co.za/trade/equity market/equities/shares/n-ordinary-
shares 
32) Levitt .D, 2004. Structuring Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
Transactions in the Mining Sector in South Africa. [PDF] Available at: 
http://www.fasken.com/files/Publication/cd8f59fd-32de-40ec-a0eb-
097e9e1e6058/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/eee36622-49ea-
457b-8321-
ac0264296d69/STRUCTURING_BEE_TRANSACTIONS.PDF. 
Accessed 20 October 2013. 
33) Mail&Guardian, 2013. Deadline looms for mining companies. [Online, 
10 May 2013]. Available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2013-05-10-00-
deadline-looms-for-mining-companies, Accessed on 15 January 2014. 
34) Martin B. & Bhyat R, n.d. Understanding the Benefits of Convertible 
Bonds. The Southern African Treasurer - Risk Management. [PDF]. 
Available at: http://www.treasury-
management.com/article/4/143/1265/understanding-the-benefits-of-
convertible-bonds.html. Accessed March 2014. 
35) Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, No. 28 of 2002. 
Republic of  South Africa. 
36) Mogoeng CJ, 2013. Constitutional Court of South Africa: Agri South 
Africa vs Minister for Minerals and Energy [2013] ZACC9, Case CCT 
51/12. 
37) Molapo. D, 2008. Factors influencing financial structures in mining 
empowerment transactions. MSc. Gordon Institute of Business 
Science, South Africa (page 8, 16 & 31). 
vi 
 
38) Mondi L, 2009. BEE investment in mining set for uncertain future. 
Mining Weekly [PDF] 10 April 2009. Available at: 
http://www.miningweekly.com/article/bee-investment-in-mining-set-for-
uncertain-future-2009-04-10. Accessed May 2014. 
39) Mothomogolo J, 2012. Development of Innovative Funding 
Mechanisms for Mining Start-Ups: A South African Case. The South 
African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy Conference. [PDF]. Available 
through: http://www.saimm.co.za/Conferences/Pt2012/953-
968_Mothomogolo.pdf [Accessed May 2014]. 
40) M’Paradzi A.S, 2006. BEE – BASIS, EVOLUTION, EVALUATIONA.  
Critical Appraisal of Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa. 
Postgraduate diploma in commercial law, University of Cape Town. 
[PDF]. Available at: http://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/4516. 
Accessed March 2014. 
41) Native Land Act, Act 27 of 1913. Republic of South Africa. 
42) New York University, n.d. Acquisitions and Takeovers. [PDF]. 
Available at: 
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/papers/acquisitions.pdf. 
Accessed April 2015.  
43) Nhlapo T.S, 2008. Black economic empowerment funding efficiency: A 
South African perspective. MSc. North West University, South Africa. 
[PDF] Available at: http://dspace.nwu.ac.za/handle/10394/2133. 
Accessed 20 December 2013. 
44) Ngwenya F.S, 2007. Successes and failures of BBBEE – a critical 
assessment. MBA. Stellenbosch University. South Africa. [PDF] 
Available at: 
vii 
 
https://scholar.sun.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10019.1/812/ngwenya_succ
esses_2007.pdf. Accessed February 2014.  
45) Obi J.N, n.d. Investment management analysis I. National Open 
University of Nigeria, school of management sciences. Unpublished. 
[PDF]. Available at: 
http://www.nou.edu.ng/NOUN_OCL/pdf/pdf2/ENT%20331%20INVEST
MENT%20MANAGEMENT%20ANALYSIS%20I.pdf. Accessed March 
2014.  
46) Olsen J, 2002. Note on Leveraged Buyouts. Tuck School of Business 
at Dartmouth College. [PDF]. Available at 
http://cpee.tuck.dartmouth.edu/uploads/documents/LBO_Note.pdf. 
Accessed May 2014.  
47) Palmer DA, 2012. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT 
Financial Accounting Acquisitions. [PDF]. Available at: 
http://www.financialmanagementdevelopment.com/Slides/handouts/15
4.pdf. Accessed April 2015. 
48) Paul E and Tierney JR, 2010. Makalani Growing A South African 
Mezzanine Fund. Colombia Business School, ID#090417, Issued on 
November 23 2010. 
49) Phillips N.E, 2004. The funding of black economic empowerment in 
South Africa. MSc. University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. [PDF]. 
Available at: 
scholar.sun.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10019.../phillips_funding_2004.pdf 
Accessed on 29 December 2013. 
50) PMG, 2013. Report of the Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources 
on public hearings on the Mining Charter. [Online]. Available at: 
www.pmg.org.za. Accessed 10 Oct 2013. 
viii 
 
51) Ramaphosa, C., Innes, D., Nzimande, B., Sachs, A, et.al, 2007. 
Visions of Black Economic Empowerment.  Auckland Park: Jacana 
Media (Pty) Ltd. 
52) Ramathe M, 2009. The use of innovative financing structures in 
facilitating BEE transactions in South Africa. MSc. University of 
Stellenbosch, South Africa. [PDF]. Available at: 
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/929. Accessed on 18 
December 2013.  
53) Rocha, 2013. Mineral Policy and Investment Lecture Notes. University 
of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg, Unpublished. 
54) Silbernagel C and Vaitkunas D, n.d. Mezzanine Finance. [PDF]. 
Available at: 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/articles/Mezzanine_Finance_Explai
ned.pdf. Accessed April 2014.  
55) Van der Nest D, 2004. The Impact of Black Economic Empowerment 
on the Management of Small Companies in South Africa. MSc. 
University of Johannesburg, South Africa. [PDF]. Available at: 
https://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za/handle/10210/319. [Accessed May 2014]. 
56) Vernon. D, 2010. Charter review can help address BEE quandary, 
p17. Business Day. [PDF, 27 July 2010]. Available at: 
www.miningforchange.co.za. Accessed 5 January 2013.  
57) Welch. I, 2009. Corporate Finance, an introduction. [e-book]. 501 
Boylston Street, Suite 900, Boston: Pearson Education, Inc. Available 
through: 
http://www.afajof.org/SpringboardWebApp/userfiles/afa/file/Free%20Te
xtbooks/Welch-ed1.pdf. Accessed April 2015.  
ix 
 
58) Woolley, R. 2005. Everyone’s guide to Black Economic 
Empowerment. South Africa: Zebra Pres
i 
 
APPENDIXES  
Appendix 1: BEE Transactions that were considered in the 
Study 
 
 
Parent Company BEE Company Asset Sold/acquired Transaction Year
1 BHP Billiton Eyesizwe Coal Matla & Glisa Colliery 2000
2 Anglo Coal Eyesizwe Coal New Clydesdale & Arnot 1999
3 BHP Billiton/Ingwe Coal Kuyasa Mining Delmas 2002
4 Anglogold Ashanti ARM 6 Shafts in Orkney, 6 shafts and a plant in Welkom 1998
5 Anglogold Ashanti ARMgold and Harmony Shaft 2 in Orkney, Bambanini, Joel, Matjabeng and Tshepong 2001
6 Anglo Platinum ARM and Various communities Modikwa Platinum Project 50:50 JV (50% of Modikwa project) 2001
7 Anglo Platinum Royal Bafokeng Resources Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mines 2002
8 Anglo Platinum\Lonplats Mvela, Bapo ba Mogale JV: Pandora Joint Venture 2002
9 Anglo American\Northam Mvelaphanda 22.5% of Northam platinum 2000
10 Aquarius Platinum Savannah Resources Consortium 29.5% of Aquarius Platinum South Africa 2003
11 Trans Hex limited Mvela Holdings 3.8% of shareholding in Trans Hex limited 2001
12 Trans Hex limited Mvela Holdings Forward purchase of 6 million Trans Hex shares 2002
13 DRD Gold Khumo Bathong Holdings 60% in DRD Gold's Crown Gold Recoveries 2002
14 DRD Gold Khumo Bathong Holdings 3% equity stake in DRD 2002
15 Eastplats Afriminerals 26% in Spitzkop platinum project 2005
16 Merafe Resources, SA Chrome Royal Bafokeng nation 29.4% of Merafe resources, formally known as SA chrome 1999
17 Ingwe Colliery/BHP Billiton Kuyasa Mining Ikhwezi Colliery 1995
18 Ingwe Colliery/BHP Billiton Endulweni Resources 2002
19 Anglo Coal Leeuw Mining and Exploration Kwazulu-Natal coal reserves,an estimated 104-million saleable tons 2002
20 Avmin/ARM Stimela mining limited 25% of Iscor 2001
21 Petmin Dark Capital (Pty) Ltd 2004
22 Petra Diamonds Sedibeng Mining (Pty) Ltd 26% of Sedibeng mine
23 Randgold & Exploration (R&E) Equitant 2003
24 AngloAmerican Inkwenkwezi 13.7 million shares in Western Areas accounting for the bulk of Anglo American’s 18% stake 2004
25 Randgold & Exploration (R&E) Marothodi Resources 26% stake in Minrico 2003
26 Randgold & Exploration (R&E) Phikoloso Mining 17% Interest in rand gold and exploration 2003
27 Anglovaal Mining Limited (Avmin) Harmony 17.25% stake in Anglovaal Mining Limited (Avmin) 2003
28 Anglovaal Mining Limited (Avmin) African Rainbow Minerals Gold limited 17.25% stake in Anglovaal Mining Limited (Avmin) 2003
29 Great Basin gold Tranter Mining 
30 Anglogold Ashanti ARMGold Freegold and Joel in a 50:50 JV 2002
31 DRD Gold Crown Gold Recoveries JV (60% Khumo Bathong/40% DRD) East Rand Proprietary mines 2002
32 Anglo Platinum ARM Mining Participation in Modikwa project 2001
33 BHP Billiton Riverside Mining Zululand Anthracite Colliery (74%) and 26% by BEE consortium 2005
34 BHP Billiton Siyanda Resources & AKA Resource Holdings Koornfontein Mine 2007
35 BHP Billiton/Samancor Manganese Ntsimbintlhe Mining 9% in Hotazel Manganese Mines 2007
36 Anglogold Ashanti Izingwe Holdings 1.5% of Anglogold Ashanti 2006
37 Anglo American Exxaro 52.1% of Exxaro 2006
38 Anglo Coal Inyosi Consortium 27% of Anglo Inyosi Coal 2007
39 AEL Tiso Consortium, Later Merged with Kagiso Trust to become KTH 25.1% of AEL 2004
40 Xtrata Kagiso Platinum Ventures XK Platinum partnership 2005
41 Anglo Platinum  Siyanda Chrome Investments Chromite recovery plant 2006
42 Anglo Platinum  Bakgatla Ba Kgafela Union Mine, Magazynskraal, Rooderand projects 2006
43 Anglo Platinum Mvelaphanda 22.5% of Northam platinum + 50% interest in Booysendal project 2007
44 Anglo Platinum Ngazana Consortium Disposal in October 2005 of the rights on the property Elandsfontein 440JQ 2005
45 Impala Platinum Royal Bafokeng Nation 13.4% of Impala Platinum 2007
46 Impala Platinum Tubatse platinum 7.5% of marula mine 2006
47 Impala Platinum Marula Platinum Trust 7.5% of marula mine 2006
48 Impala Platinum Mmakau mining 7.5% of marula mine 2006
49 African Platinum (Afplats)/Impala Platinum Bakwena ba mogopa community trust 26% in Leeukop project 
50 Impala Platinum & Lonmin Incwala 18% shareholding in western platinum and eastern platinum (18% of lonplats) 2004
51 Anglo American (PLC) Exxaro 20% of Kumba Iron Ore 2006
52 Gold Fields Mvela Gold, Subsidiary of Mvela Resources 15% of GFI South Africa 2004
53 Exxaro Merger of Kumba Resources and Eyesizwe Eyesizwe coal 2006
54 ARM and Xtrata ARM  51% of ARM coal 2006
55 Assore limited Mampa Investment Holdings 44% of Rustenburg Minerals Development Company 2004
56 Uranium One Micawber 397 (Pty) Ltd 26% in Dominion Uranium project & Bonanza gold project 2005
57 Trans Hex limited Mvela Holdings 2.2% of shareholding in Trans Hex limited 2004
58 Mvelaphanda Resources Afripalm Resources 19% of Mvelaphanda Resources & 31% of its voting rights 2007
59 DRD Gold Khumo Bathong Holdings 15% of DRD 2005
60 DRD Gold Khumo Bathong Holdings 5% of DRD 2006
61 Barplats, later bought by Eastplats Gubevu Consortium 26% of Barplats, which was later aquired by Eastplats 2005
62 Eastplats Lion Head Platinum 50:50 JV in Mareesburg platinum project 2004
63 Eastern Platinum ltd Gubevu Consortium Holdings Pty Ltd 2008
64 Platmin Moepi Group Share holding increased to 19% of Boynton 2006
65 Platmin BEE parties 5.8% of Boynton 2007
66 Great Basin Gold Tranter Gold 26% of Great Basin Gold, the Burnstone project 2007
67 WESCOAL Waterberg Portion Property Investments 31.36% of WESCOAL 2007
68 Holcim & Aveng Afrisam 85% of Afrisam 2007
69 Hernic Matlapeng Resoiurces, Mmakau Mining and Kgare Resources 15% stake in the company 2007
70 Xstrata Alloys Bakwena ba Mogopa traditional community 26 percent stake in its Rhovan vanadium business 2007
71 Afplats Bakwena Ba Mogopa community Partnership on Leeuwkop project 2006
72 Aflease Gold  Broad Based Consortium (mainly workers and communities) 26% of its gold assets 2006
73 Metorex Shanduka Coal Wakefield coal operations 2006
74 Sasol Tshwarisano 25% shareholding in Sasol's South African liquid-fuels business 2006
75 Nkwe Platinum Blue Nightingale 30% interest in its South African subsidiary 2006
76 Samancor Chrome Batho Barena Consortium 28% of Kermas South Africa 2006
77 De Beers Ponahalo holdings 26% of De Beers South Africa 2006
78 Samancor Manganese Siyanda-Inkwali Resources 50.1% of the Dense-Media Ferrosilicon Business, Debeers 30% and NEF 20% 2006
79 Sasol Ltd (SOL) (Mining) Eyesizwe Coal 35% of Igoda Coal 2006
80 JCI OrlyFunt Portfolio of Black Economic Empowerment ("BEE") joint venture investments and various mineral rights 2004
81 Rand Gold OrlyFunt 74% share  in Minrico Limited, 55.1% share capital of Free State Development and Investment Corporation 2004
82 PPC Nozala 50% stake in Afripack 2004
83 AfriOre Springlake Holding South African Coal Assets of AfriOre 2005
84 Assore limited Shanduka Resources (11.8%) 11.8 % interest in Assore 2005
85 Assore limited Bokamoso Trust (3.26%) 3.26 % interest in Assore 2005
86 Sishen Iron Ore Sishen Iron Ore Community Trust 3% ordinary shares in the Sishen Iron Ore Company (SIOC) 2006
87 BHP Billiton Optimum Coal Holdings Optimum Colliery 2008
88 BHP Billiton/Richards Bay Minerals Blue Horison Investments & ESOPS 24% in Richards Bay Minerals, 2% by employees 2009
89 Anglo Platinum Anoorag 51% of Lebowa Holdco 2009
90 Anglo Platinum Wesizwe Anglo Platinums entire 37% stake in the Western Bushveld Joint Venture 2008
91 Lonmin Platinum Shanduka 50.03% interest in Incwala 2010
92 BHP Energy Coal South Africa Optimum Coal South Africa, was aquired by Glencor Optimum Collieries and 9.5% of Richards Bay Coal terminal 2008
93 Sentula Mining /Siyanda Coal Optimum Coal South Africa, was aquired by Glencor 19.2% of the Kroonfontein mines 2008
94 Sentula Mining /Siyanda Coal Optimum Coal South Africa, was aquired by Glencor 21.8% of the Kroonfontein mines 2009
95 Sentula Mining/Siyanda Coal Optimum Coal South Africa, was aquired by Glencor 49.9% of the Kroonfontein mines 2010
96 Coal of Africa Limited (CoAL) Firefly Investments 50 mil CoAL options representing 10.85% of company shares 2009
97 Platmin Moepi Platinum (Pty) Limited 2008
98 Metorex Medu Capital 15% of shares in Vergenoeg mining company 2009
99 PPC Strategic Black Partners (1.755%) and Bafati Investment Trust (0.325%) 2.08 (1.755+0.325)% of PPC 2012
100 Coal of Africa Limited (CoAL) Rothe Investment Proprietary Limited ("Rothe") 26% stake in Keynote Trading & Investment 108 Proprietary Limited ("Keynote"), now called MbeuYashu 2012
101 Continental Coal Limited (South Africa) Masawu Investments (Pty) Limited 26% Interest in Continental Coal Limited 2008
102 Continental Coal Limited (South Africa) Sishen Iron Ore Company Community Trust (SIOC) 26% Interest in Continental Coal Limited 2011
103 Galaxy Gold Mining Limited (Galaxy Gold) Some Mpumalanga SMMEs & Bataung Gold 17.8% of Galaxy Gold Reefs (Pty) limited 2011
104 Assore limited Bokamoso Trust 10.81% of Assore limited 2009
105 IDC and Foskor Manyoro Consortium 15% of Foskor 2009
106 IDC and Foskor 2 SPVs (Staff and Comunities) 11% of Foskor 2009
107 Palabora Mining Company BEECo 26% of Palabora Copper (Proprietary) Limited (“PC”) 2010
108 Highveld Steel & Vanadium Umnotho weSizwe 23% interest in the Mapochs mine 2009
109 Petmin Dark Capital (Pty) Ltd
110 Gold Fields Invictus and South Deep Community Trust  10% holding in South Deep 2010
111 PPC Peu (1.92%), Nozala (1.82%), Portland Consortium (1.82%) and Capital Edge (1.51%). 7.07 of PPC 2008
112 Wesizwe Micawber 6% of Wesizwe 2011
113 Petra Diamonds BEE Groupings 26% of Finch mine 2011
114 De Beers Petra Diamonds Cullinan Consortium (“PDCC”) Cullinan Mine and Centenary-Cut (C-Cut) project 2008
115 Petra Diamonds Cullinan Consortium Thembinkosi Mining Investments (14%), employee share trust (12%) 26% of cullinan mine 2008
116 Sasol Ixia Coal 20% in its mining subsidiary 2010
117 Shiva Uranium Consortium of Black Investors 26% of Shiva Uranium 2010
118 ROCKWELL Diamonds African Vanguard Resources (AVR) 26% of HC Van Wyk Diamond Group (“VWDG”) and Saxendrift Mine (Pty) Ltd 2008
Legend 
Adequate information available
Partial information available
No information on funding source or structure
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Appendix 2: 1994 - 2003 Data 
 
 
Parent Company BEE Company Asset Sold/acquired 
Transaction Value 
(mil)
Transaction Year Remark
Successful Yes/no
Vendor
Third Party 
Loan
Equity (self)
Preference 
shares 
Year
1 Anglogold Ashanti ARM
6 Shafts in Orkney, 6 shafts and a plant in 
Welkom
66 66 0 0 0 1998 Yes
ARM paid R7mil for the Free State Assets, the balance of the R28mil was waived by AngloGold. No details on the funding, but indications that Banks refused to fund the Transaction 
and the CEO of Anglogold (Bobby Godsell) helped. This could be classified as some form of vendor facilitation. Also,  part of the transaction involved a tribute agreement over the 
longer life No 2 shaft in terms of which ARM would mine No 2 shaft, with 60% revenue, net of costs and capital expenditure, accruing to AngloGold
2 Anglo American\Northam Mvelaphanda 22.5% of Northam platinum 459 0 459 0 0 2000 Yes Obtained 17.5% shares from anglo @ a discount of R408mil, Standard coorporate and Merchant bank provided the financing for the transaction
3 Aquarius Platinum 
Savannah Resources Consortium 
(Savannah Platinum, Chuma Platinum 
and Malibongwe Platinum)
29.5% of Aquarius Platinum South Africa 860 0 845 15 0 2003 No
SavCon, whose members are Savannah Platinum, Chuma Platinum, Malibongwe Platinum and the Savannah Resources Community Trust, made a R15-million equity contribution 
towards funding the deal. The consortium secured a further R400-million from the Industrial Development Corporation, R245-million from the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
and R200-million from the Public Investment Commissioners (PIC). Shareholding was reported to have dropped to 9% in 2012. Shares were sold to service debt obligations and to 
pay tax. Aqualrious (2013 AR) had to intervene to prevent further loss of shares
4 DRD Gold Khumo Bathong Holdings 60% in DRD Gold's Crown Gold Recoveries 105.5 0 105.5 0 0 2002 Yes
The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) has agreed to provide KBH with the required funding. Debt was restructured in 2005 to a vendor finance to give Khumo Bathong 
Holdings additional shares in DRDgold.
5 DRD Gold Khumo Bathong Holdings 3% equity stake in DRD 68.04 0 68.04 0 0 2002 Yes
In respect of the equity stake in DRD, DRD will issue to KBH 4 794 889 new DRD ordinary shares at R14.19 per share. This represents a 10% discount to the 30-day trade weighted 
average price per DRD share on the JSE at the close of trade on 18 January.The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) has agreed to provide KBH with the required funding. 
Debt was restructured in 2005 to a vendor finance to give Khumo Bathong Holdings additional shares in DRDgold.
6 Ingwe Colliery/BHP Billiton Kuyasa Mining Ikhwezi Colliery 326.4 0 326 0 0 1995 Yes
Funding optained from Commonwealth Development Corporation, debt was repaid within a year. The first contract was an enabling arrangement which provided for limited bridging 
funding and technical assistance including managerial input, geological assistance, mining layout plans and environmental management capacity. Ingwe financed the 
Environmental Management Programme Report and the purchase of the farmland on which the present operation is situated on behalf of Kuyasa, with a per tonne mined payback 
arrangement. The right to exploit the minerals on the Ikhwezi lease would remain vested in Ingwe; however, Kuyasa were required to pay a royalty to Ingwe for their use. However 
the Kuyasa team went ahead with plans for development and production expecting that finance would eventually materialize. Negotiations with contractor Basil Read led to an 
arrangement whereby the contractor agreed to begin work and await payment until the first coal was produced and sold. Though there was funding provided by the CDC, there was 
significant vendor facilitation. The value of the deal was not disclosed so it was estimated using the value of BHP and algo deal in 2000 by multiplying the deal value ($48 mil) by the 
2000 exchange rate of 6.8
7 Anglo Coal Leeuw Mining and Exploration
Kwazulu-Natal coal reserves, comprising an 
estimated 104-million saleable tons
Value of assets 
not disclosed 
2002 No
Was in financial distress after the anthracite market collapsed due to the financila cirisi in 2009. Was rescued and aqcuired by Keaton Energy Holdings Limited in 2012. Funding 
included preference share funding by Anglo Khula & IDC and Loans by Nedbank and IDC (page 9). 
8 Randgold & Exploration (R&E) Phikoloso Mining 17% Interest in rand gold and exploration 268 34 0 0 234 2003
Randgold & Exploration is to issue 8.8 million new ordinary shares, valued at   some R268 million, to Phikoloso Mining which in return will transfer its mining-related assets to 
Randgold & Exploration. Among the assets Randgold & Exploration will acquire through this process are holdings in Anglo Platinum, Harmony Gold and Afrikander Lease, as well 
as a participation in Kabusha Mining and Finance, which owns 23 million shares in Afrikander Lease. Based on the market price of the respective companies on the  last trading 
date, such holdings have an aggregate market value of R235 million. Based on the aggregate market value of the portfolio of R235 million and the purchase consideration of R268 
million illustrated above, goodwill of R34       
million would have arisen on the transaction.34 (Goodwill, donation) and 235 (through swop of assets)
9 Anglovaal Mining Limited (Avmin) Harmony
17.25% stake in Anglovaal Mining Limited 
(Avmin)
843.5 0 850 0 0 2003 Yes
Based on R43.50 per share, the transaction was valued at R1 687 million and was paid for in cash. On 8 May 2003, Harmony Gold entered into a term loan agreement with Nedbank 
Limited for R850 million. The purpose of this term loan agreement was to fund the acquisition of 17.25% of Anglovaal Mining Limited.
10
Crown Gold Recoveries JV (60% 
Khumo Bathong/40% DRD)
East Rand Proprietary mines 90 0 90 0 0 2002 Yes
The Crown JV (60% Khumo Bathong/40% DRD) is in negotiation with the Industrial Development Corporation on loan finance for the purchase. The initial transaction was 
restructured in 2006, resulting in KBH owning 15% in DRDGold SA, In 2007 Khumo Batho had 26% shares in Crown gold while DRD had 74%. Re-structuring of the transaction was 
vendor financed. 
Funding Model (Rmil) Sustainablity 
No. The forensics 
found that the quid 
pro quo for R&E 
issuing R260 million 
worth of shares into 
the Phikoloso deal 
were valuable 
shareholdings 
supposedly held by 
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Appendix 3: 2004-2007 Data 
 
Parent Company BEE Company Asset Sold/acquired 
Transaction 
Year
Sustainablity Remark
Successful Yes/no
Vendor
Third Party 
Loan
Equity (self) Shares 
1 Anglogold Ashanti Izingwe Holdings 1.5% of Anglogold Ashanti 0 0 0 0.35 2006 Yes
This transaction will be structured in a similar manner to the loan shares issued in terms of the 
Bokamoso ESOP. 48532 shares were sold in 2006 for a value of R14m. Transaction was re-
structured in 2011 as AGA board realised that limited value would accrue to BEE shareholders 
when the shares vested. As the transaction was restructured, the initial transaction could be 
classified as unsustainable. Izingwe Holdings will acquire approximately 1,400,000 AngloGold 
Ashanti loan shares (E shares) at par value of R0.25/share
2 Anglo American Exxaro 52.1% of Exxaro 2800 4200 1400 0 2006 Yes
3 Anglo Coal Inyosi Consortium
27% of Anglo Inyosi Coal (Kriel Colliery and the four projects – Elders, 
Zondagsfontein, New Largo and Heidelberg)
6968 0 25 0 2007 Yes
R6.9 billion Vendor finance was provided @2% interest by Anglo American. Anglo Coal provided 
vendor finance of R68 million.
4 AEL
Tiso Consortium, Later Merged with Kagiso Trust to become 
KTH 
25.1% of AEL 0 376 25.1 0 2004 Yes
Vendor underwrote R200m of the loan and extended interest free loan to Community 
Development Trust (CDT)
5 Anglo Platinum Mvelaphanda 22.5% of Northam platinum + 50% interest in Booysendal project 0 0 1500 2500 2007 Yes
The 50% interest in Booysendal was later converted to Northam shares, hence 63% Mvela in 
Northam; Mvelaphanda sold shares in Northam in order to satisfy JSE listing requirements; 
R2.2bil from sale of shares to ENRC was used to pay off all debt. Mvela was aquired by Northam in 
order to resolve the pyramid structure.
6 Impala Platinum Royal Bafokeng Nation 13.4% of Impala Platinum 0 0 10600 0 2007 Yes RBN used the R10.6 bn royalty settlement to acquire shares in Impala Platinum 
7 Impala Platinum Tubatse platinum 7.5% of marula mine 0 158 0 0 2006 Yes
Implats will provide a full guarantee for the Marula Community Trust debt and will also guarantee 
Tubatse Platinum's debt until December 2014, Tubatse Platinum and Marula Community Trust 
together with Impala, which will fully guarantee the R316m up to end-2014, are in talks with two 
financial institutions to raise the debt. Vendor facilitation through loan guarantees 
8 Impala Platinum Marula Platinum Trust 7.5% of marula mine 0 158 0 0 2006 Yes
Implats will provide a full guarantee for the Marula Community Trust debt and will also guarantee 
Tubatse Platinum's debt until December 2014, Tubatse Platinum and Marula Community Trust 
together with Impala, which will fully guarantee the R316m up to end,    Tubatse Platinum and 
Marula Community Trust together with Impala, which will fully guarantee the R316m up to end-
2014, are in talks with two financial institutions to raise the debt. Vendor facilitation through loan 
guarantees.
9 Impala Platinum & Lonmin Incwala 18% shareholding in western platinum and eastern platinum (18% of lonplats) 1614.37908 1,224 0 1,062 2004 No
Impala provided vendor finance of R618m, which was partly secured by Lonmin; transaction 
failed due to poor platinum price in the 2008/2009 financial crisis. Lonmin bailed out Incwala by 
extending a $304mil loan for shanduka to buy Previous BEE shareholders.
10 Gold Fields Mvela Gold, Subsidiary of Mvela Resources 15% of GFI South Africa 450 3689 0 0 2004 Yes
11mil Gold Fields shares sold at a profit in 2009 to repay the loan, leaving Mvela with additional 
R1.3 bil to invest in Northam. Sustainability of Transaction due to high share price.
11 ARM and Xtrata ARM  51% of ARM coal 385.56 0 400 0 2006 Yes
Xstrata is providing all the finance for the joint venture and Goedgevonden. We're going to use 
that money to buy 20% of the operations that are currently there - but there's also another loan 
coming in from Xstrata for another R756 million ($123.3 million). With that we then buy 51% of 
Goedgevonden which then forms ARM Coal being the current operations and the new mine.
12 DRD Gold Khumo Bathong Holdings 15% of DRD 36 0 0 0 2005 Yes
the transaction envisages the exchange of 45% of KBH’s 60% stake in CGR and East Rand 
Proprietary Mines Limited (ERPM) for 15% of DRDGOLD’s wholly owned Blyvooruitzicht Gold 
Mining Company Limited. The effect would be the ownership by KBH of 15% of all of DRDGOLD’s 
South African operations. DRDGOLD intends to facilitate the BEE transaction through vendor 
financing.The transaction has been vendor financed by the conversion of an existing loan to KBH 
of R7.9 million and issuance of R31.8 million new KhumoGold preference shares.
13 DRD Gold Khumo Bathong Holdings 5% of DRD 4.3 0 0 0 2006 Yes 
DRDGOLD will vendor finance the transaction on condition that the terms of the vendor finance 
are determined by independent experts Ernst and Young to be
14 WESCOAL Waterberg Portion Property Investments 31.36% of WESCOAL 0 0 35.5 0 2007 Yes
"First and foremost, the BEE partners funded their own stake.", Sipho Ncobo (money web), The 
issue price represents a premium of 26,2% 
15 Sasol Tshwarisano 25% shareholding in Sasol's South African liquid-fuels business 0 1292 158 0 2006 Yes
Sasol is providing considerable facilitation and support for Tshwarisano's financing 
requirements, which amount to about R1,1 billion; Standard Bank is the sole provider of domestic 
funding of just under R1.3 billion, which has allowed it the flexibility to provide a highly 
customised solution.Ordinary shareholders injected R310 million in equity and the
remaining R1 140 million was externally funded through
preference shares.  Of the R310 million of equity, R152 million was externally
16
Samancor Chrome (Kermas South 
Africa/Kermas–Ehlobo)
Batho Barena Consortium (Samancor’s employees (5,6%), 
Sibilo Investments (4,2%), comprising local communities, and 
Nanka Investments (4,2%), which consisted of women in 
mining)
28% of Kermas South Africa 1950 0 0 0 2006 No 
Ironically, in a letter dated June 12, Kermas SA notified the shareholders in the consortium that the 
empowerment transaction had been  cancelled and that the shares would be “re- allocated”. 
Transaction was cancelled due to disputes. Kermas indicated that shares would be re-allocated 
17 Samancor Manganese Siyanda-Inkwali Resources 50.1% of the Dense-Media Ferrosilicon Business, Debeers 30% and NEF 20% 35 225 40 15 2006 Yes
Siyanda-Inkwali Resources bought the dense-media ferrosilicon business in association with 
diamond miner De Beers and the National Empowerment Fund Trust (NEF), which is a division of 
the Department of Trade and Industry.
18 Sasol Ltd (SOL) (Mining) Eyesizwe Coal 35% of Igoda Coal 0 465 25 0 2006 No
Eyesizwe Coal, which will provide R25-million in equity, will own 35% of the empowerment 
venture, while Sasol Mining holds the remaining 65% and will provide R46-million in equity. The 
balance will be provided in the form of loans. Vendor facilitation was provided by sasol. Exxaro 
quite the deal in 2009 citing tough market conditions.
19 JCI OrlyFunt
portfolio of Black Economic Empowerment ("BEE") joint venture investments and 
various mineral rights (Includes non mining assets)
909.6 0 0 490.4 2004 No
OrlyFunt will owe JCI R909,6 million on loan account, which loan  account will be secured by a 
pledge of the JCI assets, will be interest free and will be repayable within three years from the 
future cash flows or proceeds of  the disposal of the JCI assets. Components of the transaction 
did not materialise. Deal failed due to its original structure and had to be re structured . 
20 Rand Gold OrlyFunt
74% interest in the share capital of Minrico Limited and 55,1% interest in the share 
capital of Free State Development and Investment Corporation and various other 
mineral right interests (includes non-mining assests)
94.1 0 50.8 0 2004 No
in exchange for an entitlement to 8,4% of the issued ordinary share capital of OrlyFunt. In addition, 
OrlyFunt will owe Randgold R94,1 million on loan account, which loan account will be secured by 
a pledge of the Randgold assets, will be interest free and will be repayable      within three years 
from the realisation of value from the Randgold assets. Components of the transaction did not 
materialise. Deal failed due to its original structure and had to be restructured. 
21 AfriOre
Springlake Holding (NAMF and consortium of BEE parties 
Umsobomvu and Motjoli Resources and management)
South African Coal Assets of AfriOre (Springlake Colliery, the Somkele exploration 
tenements and Baobab exploration project in the Limpopo province
28 0 38 0 2005 Yes 
The balance of the purchase consideration of R24-million is financed by way of a vendor loan, 
which will soon be replaced by a draw-down loanfacility from the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC).The BEE parties are also expected to contribute R4-million in cash towards the 
total purchase price. Petmin aquired 100% of Springlake holdings for R108mil in 2005.
22 Assore limited Shanduka Resources (11.8%) 11.8 % interest in Assore 0 279.89 0 0 2005 Yes
Standard Bank will provide preference share funding in both the Shanduka transaction and the 
Community transaction in order to allow Shanduka BEECo and Community BEECo to acquire the 
Assore shares. Shanduka group looks to have made a profit of up to R2.3bn on the disposal of its 
11.8% black economic empowerment (BEE) stake in iron ore and base metals group Assore. Profit 
made as a result of soaring share price due to Commodity price boom
23 Assore limited Bokamoso Trust (3.26%) 3.26 % interest in Assore 25 52.67 0 0 2005 Yes
Standard Bank will provide preference share funding in both the Shanduka transaction and the 
Community transaction in order to allow Shanduka BEECo and Community BEECo to acquire the 
Assore shares. Assore has provided a further R25 million vendor financing to the Community 
Trust to purchase the 3.26% equity interest in Assore.
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Appendix 4: 2008-2012 Data 
 
Parent Company BEE Company Asset Sold/acquired Transaction Value (mil)
Transacti
on Year
Sustainablity Remark
Successful 
Yes/no
Vendor
Third 
Party 
Equity 
(self)
Shares
Structure 
used 
1 Anglo Platinum Anoorag
51% of Lebowa Holdco (Boikgantsho, Kwanda, Ga-Phasha 
and Lebowa Platinum mines),  changed to Bokoni platinum 
mine in 2009
R2600 0 300 0 2300 2009 No
According to the Anglo Platinum website, in 2012 Anglo Platinum and Atlatsa 
agreed in principle to the restructuring recapitalisation and refinancing of the 
transaction. Initiatives would be needed to 'optimise' Atlatsa's finances. 
Ownership structure still the same though.
2 Anglo Platinum Wesizwe
Anglo Platinum Limited’s entire 37% stake in the Western 
Bushveld Joint Venture (WBJV), (100% of Bakubung and 
26% of Maseve 1 and 3)
R1162 0 0 0 1162 2008 Yes
Wesizwe will pay Anglo Platinum an amount of R1.162 billion in the form of 
211,850,125 new shares in Wesizwe.
3 Lonmin Platinum Shanduka 50.03% interest in Incwala R2800 2500 0 300 0 2010 Yes R2.5bn in a five-year vendor loan finance package was obtained from Lonmin
4 Coal of Africa Limited (CoAL) Rothe Investment Proprietary Limited ("Rothe")
26% stake in Keynote Trading & Investment 108 Proprietary 
Limited ("Keynote"), now called MbeuYashu
0.26% of $75mil = 19.5 19.5 0 0 0 2012 Yes
BEE ownership structure for Chapudi Project Coal of Africa Limited. CoAL bears 
the funding risk for the acquisition of the Chapudi Coal Project from the Vendors 
for US$75 million and the initial costs up to bankable feasibility study on the 
Chapudi Coal Project.
5
Continental Coal Limited (South 
Africa)
Masawu Investments (Pty) Limited 26% Interest in Continental Coal Limited R215 215 0 0 0 2008 No
26% Interest was acquired by Sishen Iron Ore Community trust in 2011. It (SIOC) 
will assume the ZAR215 million intercompany loan that has accrued between CCL 
and Masawu since October 2008
6 Assore limited Bokamoso Trust 10.81% of Assore limited R2100 2100 0 0 0
Preferen
ce 
shares
2009 Yes
The deal, which was facilitated through Assore vendor finance, involved the 
Bokamoso Trust, whose beneficiaries included the communities in and around 
Assore's operations. The transaction, which was still subject to the fulfilment of 
various conditions, would be facilitated through preference share funding, as well 
as a portion of interest-free funding, without any recourse to third-party finance.
7 IDC and Foskor Manyoro Consortium 15% of Foskor R9500x15%= R1425 1425 0 0 0 2009 Yes
To ensure that all interested parties from all parts of South Africa were able to 
participate, the IDC ran a competitive bidding process and has provided a fully 
vendor-financed funding package for all parties.
8 IDC and Foskor 2 SPVs (Staff and Comunities) 11% of Foskor R9500x11%=1045 1045 0 0 0 2009 Yes
To ensure that all interested parties from all parts of South Africa were able to 
participate, the IDC ran a competitive bidding process and has provided a fully 
vendor-financed funding package for all parties.
9 Highveld Steel & Vanadium Umnotho weSizwe 23% interest in the Mapochs mine R540*(23/26) = R478 463 0 15 0
Dividents 
used to 
repay
2009 Yes
Umnotho is making a R15m upfront cash payment; the balance owed to Highveld 
will be paid through dividends it receives from Highveld shares owned by 
Umnotho.
10 Gold Fields Invictus and South Deep Community Trust  10% holding in South Deep  R825 825 0 0 0 2010 Yes BEE Co issued Gold Fields shares at almost 99.5% discount 
11 PPC
Peu (1.92%), Nozala (1.82%), Portland Consortium (1.82%) 
and Capital Edge (1.51%).
7.07 of PPC R1250 0 1184.6 65.4 0 2008 No
Transaction funded by a credit sale structure underwritten by Standard Bank of 
South Africa,  PPC CEO Ketso Gordhan said last month the existing deal was 
"under water and badly structured", and was costly to the company. Transaction 
was re-structured, involving the re-classification of debt to equity
12 Petra Diamonds
Petra Diamonds Employee Trust 5% and Senakha 
Diamonds Investments (Pty) Ltd 21% (Sedibeng Mining 
(Pty) Ltd 17%, Lexshell 844 Investments (Pty) Ltd 2%, 
Namoise Mining (Pty) Ltd 2%)
26% of Finch mine R 370.50 370.5 0 0 0 2011 Yes
Petra will loan BEE partners their 26% of the consideration for Finsch (R370.5m), 
with interest at commercial rates. The Loan will be repaid from cashflow from the 
mine.
13 De Beers 
Petra Diamonds Cullinan Consortium (“PDCC”), Whose 
empowerment partner is Thembinkosi Mining Investments 
(14%), employee share trust (12%). Other Shareholders: 
Petra (37%), Al Rajhi Holdings (73%).
Cullinan Mine and Centenary-Cut (C-Cut) project R1000 0 543 457 0 SPV 2008 Yes (re-check)
14
Petra Diamonds Cullinan 
Consortium (“PDCC”)
Thembinkosi Mining Investments (14%), employee share 
trust (12%)
26% of cullinan mine 26% of R1400 = R340 340 0 0 0 SPV 2008 Yes
The PDCC BEE partners’ 26% interest in Cullinan has been funded by Petra/Al 
Rajhi. The BEE partners’ share of the Cullinan funding is to be repaid from the 
BEE share of future cash flows from the mine, after servicing interest at 
appropriate interest rates. The BEE partners can arrange independent financing 
to repay the Al Rajhi/Petra loan.
15 Sasol Ixia Coal 20% in its mining subsidiary R1845 1060 738 47 0 2010 Yes
The transaction is financed through equity (R47 million) and a combination of 
third party funding and Sasol facilitation. It is currently envisaged that 
approximately 40% of the transaction will be funded through third party debt; 
however this is dependent on market conditions prevailing at the time. 11 October 
2007
16 Shiva Uranium 
Consortium of Black Investors (consortium included 
Mabengela Investments, headed by Duduzane Zuma - son 
of incumbent South African President Jacob Zuma - the 
MK War Veterans Women's Group, the MK War Veterans, 
a local community trust and an employee trust.)
26% of Shiva Uranium 74 74 0 0 0 2010 Yes
He added that a consortium of black investors had acquired 26% of Shiva 
fromOakbay Resources and Energy, through a vendor-funded transaction.
17 ROCKWELL Diamonds African Vanguard Resources (AVR)
26% of HC Van Wyk Diamond Group (“VWDG”) and 
Saxendrift Mine (Pty) Ltd
84 61.6 0 22.5 0 2008 No
As part of the vendor- financed BEE deal concluded in 2008, AVR paid an amount 
of $2.9m to acquire a 26% interest – but a balance of $7.9m remained outstanding 
following a crash in the diamond market. 10% holding in Rockwell at group level
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Appendix 5: Example of BEE Questionnaire that was sent to the DMR 
 
Parent Company BEE Company Description of the transaction Asset Sold/acquired 
Ownership/Shares 
Acquired (%)
Effective Ownership 
(2014) Transaction Year
Structure of the Tranaction Was (is) the transaction sustainable?
Remark on what made the trasaction sustainable or caused it to 
fail
Vendor (debt) Vendor (Donation) Self/Equity Third party (debt)
Preference share 
instruments 
SPV, Leveraged buyout, Deravative 
instruments etc
Yes/No
1 BHP Billiton Eyesizwe Coal, Merged with Kumba non iron ore in 2006 to become Exxaro Matla & Glisa Colliery 2000
2 Anglo Coal Eyesizwe Coal, Merged with Kumba non iron ore in 2006 to become Exxaro New Clydesdale & Arnot 1999
3 BHP Billiton/Ingwe Coal Kuyasa Mining Delmas 2002
4 BHP Billiton Riverside Mining Zululand Anthracite Colliery (74%) and 26% by BEE consortium 2005
5 BHP Billiton Siyanda Resources & AKA Resource Holdings Koornfontein Mine 2007
6 BHP Billiton Optimum Coal Holdings Optimum Colliery 2008
7 BHP Billiton/Samancor Manganese Ntsimbintlhe Mining 9% in Hotazel Manganese Mines 2007
8 BHP Billiton/Richards Bay Minerals Blue Horison Investments & ESOPS 24% in Richards Bay Minerals, 2% by employees 2009
9 Anglo Platinum Anoorag
51% of Lebowa Holdco (Boikgantsho, Kwanda, Ga-Phasha and Lebowa 
Platinum mines),  changed to Bokoni platinum mine in 2009
2009
10 Anglogold Ashanti ARM 6 Shafts in Orkney, 6 shafts and a plant in Welkom 1998
11 Anglogold Ashanti ARMgold and Harmony Shaft 2 in Orkney, Bambanini, Joel, Matjabeng and Tshepong 2001
12 Anglogold Ashanti Izingwe Holdings 0.4% of Anglogold Ashanti 2006
13 Anglo American Exxaro 52.1% of Exxaro 2006
14 Anglo Coal Inyosi Consortium
27% of Anglo Inyosi Coal (Kriel Colliery and the four projects – Elders, 
Zondagsfontein, New Largo and Heidelberg)
2007
15 AEL Tiso Consortium, Later Merged with Kagiso Trust to become KTH 25.1% of AEL 2004
16 Anglo Platinum ARM and Various communities Modikwa Platinum Project 50:50 JV (50% of Modikwa project) 2001
17 Anglo Platinum Royal Bafokeng Resources Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mines 2002
18 Anglo Platinum Lonmin, Mvela, Bapo ba Mogale JV: Pandora Joint Venture 2002
19 Xtrata Kagiso Platinum Ventures XK Platinum partnership 2005
20 Anglo Platinum  Siyanda Chrome Investments Chromite recovery plant 2006
21 Anglo Platinum  Bakgatla Ba Kgafela Union Mine, Magazynskraal, Rooderand projects 2006
22 Anglo Platinum Mvelaphanda 22.5% of Northam platinum + 50% interest in Booysendal project 2007
23 Anglo Platinum Ngazana Consortium 
The disposal in October 2005 of the rights on the property Elandsfontein 
440JQ to Eland Platinum Mines (EPM), with the Ngazana Consortium holding 
a 26% interest in EPM.
2005
24 Anglo Platinum Wesizwe Western Bushveld JV 2008
25 Impala Platinum Royal Bafokeng Nation 12.1% of Impala Platinum 2007
26 Impala Platinum Tubatse platinum 7.5% of marula mine 2006
27 Impala Platinum Marula Platinum Trust 7.5% of marula mine 2006
28 Impala Platinum Mmakau mining 7.5% of marula mine 2006
29 Impala Platinum Bakwena ba mogopa community trust 26% in Leeukop project 
30 Impala Platinum & Lonmin Incwala 18% shareholding in western platinum and eastern platinum (18% of lonplats) 2004
31 Lonmin Platinum Shanduka 50.03% interest in Incwala 2010
32 Anglo American (PLC) Exxaro 20% of Kumba Iron Ore 2006
33 Gold Fields Mvela Gold, Subsidiary of Mvela Resources 15% of GFI South Africa 2004
34 Exxaro Merger of Kumba Resources and Eyesizwe Eyesizwe coal 
35 ARM and Xtrata, check page 50 ARM  51% of ARM coal
36 Assore limited Mampa Investment Holdings 44% of Rustenburg Minerals Development Company 2004
37 Assore limited Shanduka Resources & Bokamoso community trust 15.02% of Assore limited 2006
38 Aquarius Platinum Savannah Resources Consortium 29.5% of Aquarius Platinum South Africa 2003
39 Uranium One Micawber 397 (Pty) Ltd 26% in Dominion Uranium project & Bonanza gold project 2005
40 Trans Hex limited Mvela Holdings 3.8% of shareholding in Trans Hex limited 2001
41 Trans Hex limited Mvela Holdings 2.2% of shareholding in Trans Hex limited 2004
42 Trans Hex limited Mvela Holdings Forward purchase of 6 million Trans Hex shares 2002
43 BHP Energy Coal South Africa Optimum Coal South Africa 9.5% of Richards Bay Coal terminal 2008
44 Sentula Mining Optimum Coal South Africa 19.2% of the Kroonfontein mines 2008
45 Sentula Mining Optimum Coal South Africa 21.8% of the Kroonfontein mines 2009
46 Sentula Mining Optimum Coal South Africa 49.9% of the Kroonfontein mines 2010
47 Coal of Africa Limited (CoAL) Firefly Investments 50 mil CoAL options representing 9.5% of company shares 2009
48 DRD Gold Khumo Bathong Holdings 60% in DRD Gold's Crown Gold Recoveries 2002
49 DRD Gold Khumo Bathong Holdings 15% of DRD 2005
50 DRD Gold Khumo Bathong Holdings 5% of DRD 2006
51 PPC Existing black business parters and women's group 2012
52 Coal of Africa Limited (CoAL) Rothe Investment Proprietary & King Makhado Holdings 26% stake in Keynote Trading and Investment 2012
53 Continental Coal Limited (South Africa) Sishen Iron Ore Company Community Trust (SIOC) 26% Interest in Continental Coal Limited 2011
54
Galaxy Gold Mining Limited (Galaxy 
Gold)
Some Mpumalanga SMMEs & Bataung Gold 17.8% of Galaxy Gold Reefs (Pty) limited 2011
55 Assore limited 10.81% of Assore limited 2009
56 IDC and Foskor Manyoro Consortium 15% of Foskor 2009
57 IDC and Foskor 2 SPVs (Staff and Comunities) 11% of Foskor 2009
58 De Beers Setjhaba carriers load and hauling of its Kimberley mines tailings resources 2008
59 Xstrata Alloys Bakwena ba Mogopa traditional community 26 percent stake in its Rhovan vanadium business 2007
60 De Beers Ponahalo holdings 26% of De Beers South Africa 2006
61 Ingwe Colliery/BHP Billiton Endulweni Resources 2002
62 Anglo Coal Leeuw Mining and Exploration Kwazulu-Natal coal reserves, comprising an estimated 104-million saleable tons 2002
63 PPC
Peu (1.92%), Nozala (1.82%), Portland Consortium (1.82%) and Capital Edge 
(1.51%).
7.07% of PPC 2008
64 PPC Nozala 50% stake in Afripack 2004
65 De Beers 
Petra Diamonds Cullinan Consortium (“PDCC”), Whose empowerment partner 
is Thembinkosi Mining Investments (14%), employee share trust (12%). Other 
Shareholders: Petra (37%), Al Rajhi Holdings (73%).
Cullinan Mine and Centenary-Cut (C-Cut) project 2008
66
Petra Diamonds Cullinan Consortium 
(“PDCC”)
Thembinkosi Mining Investments (14%), employee share trust (12%) 26% of cullinan mine 2008
67 Petra Diamonds Sedibeng Mining (Pty) Ltd 26% of Sedibeng mine
68 Sasol Ixia Coal 20% in its mining subsidiary 2007
69 Sasol Tshwarisano 25% shareholding in Sasol's South African liquid-fuels business 2006
70 Sasol Ltd (SOL) Eyesizwe Coal 35% of Igoda Coal 2006
71 Gold Fields BEE Co 1 and BEE Co 2 BEE CO 1: 600 000 goldfields shares, BEE CO 2 10% holding in South Deep 2010
72 Petra Diamonds
Petra Diamonds Employee Trust 5% and Senakha Diamonds Investments (Pty) 
Ltd 21% (Sedibeng Mining (Pty) Ltd 17%, Lexshell 844 Investments (Pty) Ltd 2%, 
Namoise Mining (Pty) Ltd 2%)
26% of Finch mine 2011
73 Wesizwe Micawber 6% of Wesizwe 2011
74 JCI OrlyFunt
portfolio of Black Economic Empowerment ("BEE") joint venture investments 
and various mineral rights
2004
75 Rand Gold OrlyFunt venture investments and various mineral rights 2004
76 Avmin/ARM Stimela mining limited Share holding in Iscor limited 2001
77
Samancor Chrome (Kermas South 
Africa)
Batho Barena Consortium 28% of Kermas South Africa 2006
78 Samancor Manganese Siyanda-Inkwali Resources dense-media ferrosilicon business 2006
79 Metorex Shanduka Coal
Wakefield coal operations (Bankfontein, Leeuwfontein, Lakeside and Middle- 
burg Townlands Collieries)
2006
80 Metorex Medu Capital 15% of shares in Vergenoeg mining company 2009
81 Palabora Mining Company (BBBEE) partners 26% of Palabora Mining Company 2009
82 WESCOAL Waterberg Portion Property Investments 34.5% of WESCOAL 2007
83 AfriOre
Springlake Holding (NAMF and consortium of BEE parties Umsobomvu and 
Motjoli Resources and management)
South African Coal Assets of AfriOre (Springlake Colliery, the Somkele 
exploration tenements and Baobab exploration project in the Limpopo province
2005
84 Petmin Dark Capital (Pty) Ltd
85 Nkwe Platinum Blue Nightingale 30% interest in its South African subsidiary 2006
86 Hernic Matlapeng Resoiurces, Mmakau Mining and Kgare Resources 15% stake in the company 2007
87 Afplats Bakwena Ba Mogopa community Partnership on Leeuwkop project 2006
88 Aflease Gold 26% of its gold assets 2006
89 Mvelaphanda Resources Afripalm Resources 19% of Mvelaphanda Resources & 31% of its voting rights 2007
90 Barplats, later bought by Eastplats Gubevu Consortium 26% of Barplats, which was later aquired by Eastplats
91 Eastplats Lion Head Platinum 50:50 JV in Mareesburg platinum project 2004
92 Platmin Moepi Group 27.61% of Boynton 
93 Great Basin Gold Tranter Gold 26% of Great Basin Gold, the Burnstone project 2007
94 Merafe Resources, SA Chrome Royal Bafokeng nation 29.4% of Merafe resources, formally known as SA chrome 1999
Value of 
Acquisition/Transaction 
(Rmil)
Source of Funding (Rmil)
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